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viHIGHLIGHTS
Export credit guarantees are an important component of the world wheat trade.  All
major exporting countries of agricultural  commodities have some form of export credit
insurance/guarantee  program.  The purpose of this report is to provide background on export
credit  programs  for agricultural  products.  Previous research, historical  usage, and export
credit  program  provisions are summarized.  Relevant issues confronting export credit
programs will be identified and discussed.
During the 1980s and early 1990s,  the United States was the largest  provider of
export credit guarantees  for wheat and wheat  flour, followed by  Canada.  The geographical
focus of credit programs has changed over time.  Egypt, Brazil, and China were the principal
recipients of export credit guarantees  for wheat during the early 1980s.  Significant importers
under credit during the late 1980s included Egypt, Iraq, Korea, Morocco, and Algeria.
Large amounts of credit guarantees were extended by wheat exporting countries to the
Former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  In fact, credit guarantees  for wheat
exports during the 1990-92 period were heavily concentrated in the Former Soviet  Union
(FSU).  Subsequent defaults have revealed the risks of such program concentration.
There have been important changes in creditworthiness of wheat importing countries
during the past two decades.  Changes in financial indicators  for wheat importers have been
similar to those for developing countries.  From the early 1970s through the early 1980s,
wheat importers as a group experienced a dramatic rise in external indebtedness and fall in
debt-servicing capacity.  In the late 1980s ending in the early 1990s,  the debt buildup of
wheat importers (on average) slowed, some financial measures (e.g.,  debt-service ratios)
improved, and  impaired access to commercial credit continued.  When the country risk
ratings  published by Euromoney are weighted by  trade shares, they suggest little change in
creditworthiness  for wheat importing countries in the past decade.
For wheat importers using credit guarantees, a subset that has changed through time,
selected financial indicators (weighted by  share of export credit utilized) show more marked
change during the past decade.  Most striking are increases in external debt levels.  Net debt
(external debt minus international  reserves) relative to exports increased  more sharply for this
group of countries between 1973 and 1982.  However, net debt declined to levels comparable
to those for average wheat importers in 1992.  The average ratio of international  reserves to
imports, a standard  measure of international  liquidity, also showed deterioration  for this
group of countries  from 1973 to 1982 and slight improvement in 1992.  Although some
indicators suggest an improvement in financial conditions  for credit importers, debt levels are
generally higher and Euromoney risk ratings indicate a larger decline in creditworthiness  for
credit importers in 1992 than for all wheat importers.
viiOther economic and demographic data can be used to categorize the importing
countries that receive credit guarantees.  Based on cluster analysis, the importers receiving
guarantees appear  to fall into four groups of countries, characterized  by similar income levels
and consumption patterns.  Three of these groups appear to hold potential as markets for
value-added wheat products, while the fourth,  consisting of low income countries, is likely to
remain a market for exports of wheat and intermediate  processed goods.
Most of the credit  programs offered by agricultural  exporting countries  provide more
flexibility, both in credit terms and administration, than programs  provided by the United
States.  Further, the U.S. program is operated  as a highly visible public credit guarantee
program, while programs  by other countries are more comparable to insurance and are less
transparent  to other exporting countries.
Research in the area of export credit guarantees has  focused on the justification of
export subsidies, program costs, the subsidy value of credit guarantees, and the additionality
(i.e., export creation) they may entail.  Welfare effects  of export subsidies have been
addressed in numerous studies.  Export credit programs have attracted  less attention than
direct price subsidies (such as provided under the  U.S. Export Enhancement Program, EEP).
However, many of the issues (and  welfare implications) are the same.  Strategic
considerations, the use of export credit programs as a response or deterrent to competitors,
are highlighted in several studies and have been cited as justification  for these programs.
GSM programs  provide an implicit subsidy to foreign importers in the form of lower
interest.  The methodology for valuing this subsidy and estimates for different recipients and
time periods are reviewed.  Reported subsidies for exports of wheat under credit from 1979 to
1992 indicate an average implicit subsidy of 4% of the value of GSM allocations.  Estimates
for interest subsidies for selected years and countries ranged  from $0.29 to $18.89 per metric
ton.
Many issues now confront credit guarantee  programs  for U.S. agricultural  exports.
Most of these relate to program  justification, additionality, program costs, provisions,
competition with EEP subsides and other exporting country's programs, and allocation
decisions.  The future evolution of these programs will reflect new global disciplines  for
export subsidies and efforts of policymakers to contain  program costs and improve
effectiveness.
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IN  INTERNATIONAL  GRAIN  MARKETS:
BACKGROUND  AND  ISSUES 1
Bruce L.  Dahl,  D.  Demcey  Johnson,
William W.  Wilson,  and  Cole R.  Gustafson*
INTRODUCTION
Export credit  and guarantee  programs  have become  important tools for exporting
agricultural  products.  Prior to the  1980s,  agricultural  exports under credit  guarantee
programs  were limited.  In 1990,  29 percent of U.S.  wheat,  12 percent of U.S.  corn,  30
percent of U.S. barley,  and 7  percent of U.S.  soybean exports  were  sold using the
Commodity  Credit Corporation's  GSM-102 and GSM-103  export credit guarantee programs
(Suarez).  During the  1980s  and early  1990s,  Canada,  Australia,  France,  and other
competitor  countries responded  to market  and competitive  conditions  with expanded use  of
existing credit programs.  Throughout the  1980s,  the five  largest exporting  countries  (United
States,  Canada,  European  Union (EU),  Australia,  and Argentina)  exported  10 to 20  million
metric tons of wheat per year under credit guarantee  programs.  Exports of wheat  under
credit guarantees  have increased  from  near  11  million metric  tons in Fiscal  Year  1988 to
over 25  million metric  tons in 1991  (approximately  27 percent of world trade) before
declining  to about 15  million metric tons  in 1992.
Trends  in world wheat trade  suggest that credit guarantee  programs  will remain  an
important  tool for exporting  agricultural  products in the future despite  recent defaults by  one
of the principal  users,  Russia.  Virtually  all of the gains  in world wheat trade over the next
decade  are expected to  come from developing  countries,  of which many have credit problems
(Schwartz  and  Surls).  Further,  exporting  countries  may  be required  to extend credit
guarantees  to maintain current market shares  (Vanderbeek,  1994).  Countries unwilling  or
unable to  extend  credit may have to offer proportionally  lower  prices to maintain export
market  shares.
This report provides  an overview and  selected analysis  of export credit  and credit
guarantee  programs in  international  grain markets.  There  are six sections.  First,
background  information is presented  on historical usage of credit programs  with comparisons
across  exporting  and importing  countries.  A review  of the  Russian credit  situation  is also
presented.  Second,  export credit programs  of the major grain exporting  countries  are
described  and compared.  Third,  the implicit  subsidy value  (to importers)  of GSM credit
guarantees  is analyzed,  and cross-country  comparisons  are  made.  Fourth,  previous research
'Research  represented  in this report  was conducted under a  USDA/CSRS  research
grant,  "Export Credit  in International  Wheat Trade,"  #93-37400-9464.
*Research associate,  assistant professor,  professor,  and professor and chairman,
respectively,  Department  of Agricultural  Economics,  North Dakota  State University,  Fargo.on export  subsidies,  and on credit programs  in particular  are reviewed.  Fifth, policy issues
relating to  the design and  operation of U.S.  programs are  discussed.  Sixth,  the report ends
with a  summary.
GRAIN TRADE  USING  CREDIT GUARANTEES
Credit and credit  guarantee  programs  are provided  by most countries exporting
agricultural  products.  These programs  typically  include  export credit guarantees,  export
credit  insurance,  direct export credit,  and credit sales  under foreign  aid programs.  This
section presents  an overview  of the historical  use of export credit programs  by exporting  and
importing  countries.  Credit use by  the Former  Soviet Union (FSU)  is examined  in detail.
Dynamic changes  in macro financial  and  social economic  characteristics  of importers  are
examined  in the final  subsection.
Data Sources
All major exporting  countries  of agricultural  commodities  have some form of export
credit program.  The  following  analysis  compares  the  use of credit programs  by  5 major
exporting  countries  of wheat and wheat flour:  the United  States,  Canada,  EU,  Australia,  and
Argentina. 2  Some countries  offer export credit guarantees  primarily  for exports  of wheat
(Canada  and Australia),  and wheat exports represent  a major portion of overall agricultural
trade.
Data were obtained  from several  sources.  U.S.  export volumes  by  importing  country
were obtained  from USDA-FAS.  Canadian  export volumes of wheat under credit programs
by  importing  country were  obtained  from annual  reports of the Canadian  Wheat Board.  EU,
Australian,  and Argentine  export  volumes for wheat by  importing  country  up to  1987  were
from the IWC  (1988).  Later year's data for the EU  by importing country  were derived  from
monthly  data  reported  in the IWC  Grain Market Report (Various  issues).  Data after  1987
for credit guarantees  by importing country  were  not available  for Australia  or Argentina. 3
Total Australian  exports under credit programs  after  1987 were  gathered  from the annual
reports  of the  Export Finance  and Insurance  Corporation  (EFIC),  when  available.
2Hereafter,  sales of wheat  and wheat flour are  aggregated,  with flour converted  into
its wheat equivalent.
3Information on exports and  imports under credit programs  is somewhat  limited.
Information on Australian  and Argentine exports  under credit programs was  not available  for
certain years  or was available  only on a total export  basis.
2Exports Under Credit:  Comparison  Across  Exporting  Countries
Use  of credit programs  by  the major  exporting countries for wheat varied
considerably  for the crop years  1980-1991.  The combined  total  exports of wheat  and wheat
flour under credit programs  by  the five major  exporting countries  (Argentina,  Australia,
Canada,  EU,  and the U.S.)  varied from 10 million metric tons  in 1981  (10.5  percent of total
exports)  to more than 25  million metric  tons in  1991  (26.6 percent of total exports)  (Figure
1.1).  However,  use of credit programs  for exports of wheat within each of these five major
exporting  countries  has varied widely.
The level  of wheat exports under credit programs  has been  largest for the U.S.  and
Canada.  From  1980 to  1991,  the  U.S.  exported  an average of 8.5 million metric tons of
wheat per year under credit programs  (Figure  1.2).  Canada exported an  average  of 3.9
million metric  tons per year over the same period (Figure  1.3),  considerably  less than the
U.S.  volume.  However,  Canadian exports under credit averaged 6.5 million metric tons per
year during  1989-1991,  largely due  to increased exports  to  the Soviet Union.  Meanwhile,
the EU,  Australia,  and  Argentina exported  an average of 1.7,  2.4,  and  .1 million metric tons
per year,  respectively  (Figures  1.4,  1.5,  and  1.6).  Australia experienced  a  steady  increase  in
exports of wheat under credit from  1980-1989.  However,  in  1990 and  1992,  exports  under
credit dropped  significantly,  likely due to defaults by the  Soviet Union.  EU  exports under
credit programs  were  more consistent throughout this period.  Argentina  has used export
credits  more  sporadically.
Reliance on credit guarantees  by major wheat exporting  countries has  also varied.
Canadian exports  of wheat under  credit programs  declined  from a high of 35.3 percent of all
wheat exports  in 1982 to 7.9 percent of all wheat  exports  in 1988.  Canadian  exports under
credit then rose to  a high of 48 percent of wheat exports  in  1991  (Figure  1.7).  Much of this
variability in Canadian reliance  on export credit  guarantees  can be attributed  to the  volume of
exports  to the USSR.  Wheat  exports from the EU under credit ranged  from a low  of 3.8
percent  in  1988 to  a high of 16.3  percent  in  1982.  U.S.  exports  of wheat under credit
ranged from 7.8  percent of total wheat exports  in  1981  to a high of 37.4 percent  of exports
in  1991.
Credit programs have  targeted  different importing  countries  over time.  The United
States  exported  more than 2  million metric tons (MMT) from  1980-1984  to Brazil,  Egypt,
Iraq,  Korea,  Morocco,  and  Portugal (Figure 2.1).  Brazil received  the  largest amount  of
exports under credit from the U.S.  during this  time period,  with almost  10 MMT of wheat
exports under credit.  From 1985-1989,  Egypt was the importer  receiving  the most wheat
exports  under U.S.  credit programs,  with almost  10 MMT under credit.  Algeria,  Iraq,
Korea,  and Morocco  received  more  than 2 MMT  each during this  same period.  From  1990-
1992,  the Former Soviet  Union received  the largest volume of wheat  exports under U.S.
credit programs  (9.5  MMT).  Algeria,  Korea,  and Pakistan also  received large  amounts  of
wheat exports under  credit programs.  From  1982 to  1992,  the U.S.  has  extended  wheat
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Figure  1.1 Wheat Exports by 5 Major Countries:
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Figure  1.3  Canada Cash and Credit Wheat Exports,  1981-1992.
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Argentina Cash and Credit Wheat Exports, 1981-1992.
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Figure 2.1  United States Wheat Exports Under Credit Guarantees,
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LCanada exported  wheat under credit programs  during the early  1980s  to Brazil,
China,  Egypt,  Iraq,  Poland,  and the  USSR (Figure 2.2).  Each  of these countries received  in
excess of 1 MMT of wheat under credit programs.  Brazil,  the USSR,  and Poland were the
three  largest recipients  of Canadian export credit with 6.4,  5.1,  and 3.3 MMT of wheat,
respectively.  From  1985-1989,  the USSR,  Iraq,  Brazil,  and  Algeria  were the largest
recipients  of Canadian credit.  Canadian wheat exports under credit to each of these  countries
ranged  from  1.8 to 3.6 MMT.  In  1990 and  1992,  Canada  exported  13.5  MMT of wheat to
the FSU under credit programs.  Other countries  receiving  more than 1 MMT of wheat
under credit included  Algeria and  Brazil.  Canada has consistently  exported  wheat under
credit programs  to 4 to 9 countries per year  from  1973-1992.
Throughout the  1980s  and early  1990s,  the EU exported wheat under credit
guarantees  to 3 to 7 countries  per year.  From  1980 to  1984,  most of the EU's wheat exports
under credit guarantees  went to China,  Egypt,  and Morocco  (Figure 2.3),  each receiving  in
excess of 1.8 MMT under credit programs.  Lesser amounts  of credit  were extended  to
Poland,  Tunisia,  Ethiopia,  Cuba,  Brazil,  Angola,  and Turkey.  From  1985 to  1989,  wheat
exports under credit  from the EU went largely  to Egypt,  Morocco,  Syria,  USSR,  Tunisia,
Algeria,  and Turkey.  In 1990-1992,  exports  under credit went  primarily  to the Former
Soviet Union, Algeria,  Morocco  and Romania.  Thus,  during  the  1980s  and early  1990s,
Africa and  the Middle  East accounted  for a large  share of EU  wheat exports under credit
programs,  with large credit  guarantees  to China  in the early  1980s  and the USSR/Former
Soviet Union in the late  1980s  and early  1990s.
Imports Under Credit:  Comparison Across  Importing Countries
Imports  of wheat under credit  programs have  varied through time and across
importing countries.  In the early  1980s (1980-1984),  the three largest recipients  of export
credits  (in volume terms)  were  Brazil,  China,  and Egypt (Figure 3.1).  Other  countries
making  significant use of credit guarantees  (percent of imports under credit programs greater
than 50 percent)  in the  early  1980s  were Brazil,  Ecuador,  Iraq,  Morocco,  and Portugal
(Figure 3.2).  Except for Ecuador,  these  countries were  also large users  in volume terms.
During  1985-1989,  the composition of importing countries using export credit
programs  changed.  Egypt remained  a  large user of export credits  along with Iraq,  Korea,
Morocco,  and Algeria  (Figure  3.3).  Brazil and China reduced  wheat  imports under credit
dramatically.  Brazil  dropped from imports  of over  16 MMT to just over 3 MMT.  Brazil's
imports under credit for wheat also dropped from near 77  percent of total  wheat  imports
under credit to 28 percent.  China stopped  importing  wheat under credit guarantees  altogether
in  1983.  Reliance  on credit programs  by many of the  other importing countries  also
changed,  with Algeria,  Ecuador,  Iraq,  Mexico,  and Morocco  now importing  more than 50
percent of wheat  and wheat flour imports under  credit programs  (Figure 3.4).  Meanwhile,
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Figure 2.2  Canada Wheat Exports Under Credit Guarantees,










S1980-1984  1985-1989  U  1990-1992
Figure 2.3  EU Wheat Exports Under Credit Guarantees, by Importing Country,
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Figure 3.1  Wheat Imports Under Credit Programs,








Figure 3.2  Percent of Wheat Imports Under Credit Programs,
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Figure 3.3  Wheat Imports Under Credit Programs,
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Figure 3.4  Percent of Wheat Imports Under Credit Programs,
by Importing Country, 1985-1989.
:B  IIB~ l~~"  93 048In 1990-1992,  changes  in the political and economic  situation of the Former  Soviet
Union (FSU) had major implications  for credit  programs.  The FSU became  a  huge user of
export  credit programs,  with imports under credit  (dollar value) more than three times  as
high as that for any  other importer  (Figure  3.5).  The  percent of FSU wheat  imports under
credit programs  amounted to more than 45  percent.  Also during  1990-1992,  Algeria
Romania,  and Pakistan  relied heavily  on credit programs,  importing more than 95,  80,  and
55 percent of wheat  imports under  credit programs,  respectively  (Figure  3.6).
Evolution  of  Russian Credit and Reactions of Exporting Countries
The USSR  was  a limited  user of export credit programs  in the  1980s.  Prior to  1988,
most sales  of grains to the  Soviet Union were made  strictly on a cash basis,  except  for
periodic  (though large) credit sales  by Canada.  Major purchases  under credit programs
during  this time included  5.0 MMT  of wheat and  1.4 MMT  of barley purchased from
Canada  in  1982.  No other purchases  were made under credit programs until  1989.  At that
time,  exports under credit programs  were extended  by the EU  and Canada.  Credit
guarantees  were later  extended  by the  United  States  in 1990  (FY  1991).  Continuing levels  of
credit guarantees  were extended  by  all three exporting countries  in  1990 and  1991.  This
included Ecu  1.5  billion (US$  1.65  billion)  in credit extended by  the EU  in December  1991.
In  1992,  exports from  Canada and the U.S.  under  guarantees  dropped  significantly,  while
exports  from the  EU continued  to rise (Figure 4).
In September  1991,  FSU defaults  on Canadian credit guarantees  prompted Canada  to
suspend shipments.  Canada's  total credit line to the  FSU at that time was  C$1.5 bn.  The
United  States also changed  provisions at this time for new  GSM-102  credit guarantees to the
FSU,  Russia,  and  Ukraine.  Coverage  was  increased from 98 to  100 percent of the principal.
The  interest coverage  was also extended,  guaranteeing  interest  at the prevailing  rate for 52-
week  Treasury bills.  However,  since  the breakup  of the Soviet  Union,  only Russia has
received  the  100 percent  guarantee  for principal.  The  other republics have  received  the
standard  98 percent guarantee  (Sheffield).
In September  1992,  the U.S.  announced  $1.15  bn in assistance to the  FSU,  including
$900 million in GSM-102  credits and  $250 million for PL-480.  Of the $900 million
allocated to GSM-102  credit guarantees,  $100 million  was made  available  in FY  1992,  $500
million was available  from October  to  December  1992,  and $300  million in  1993.  However,
in November  1992,  GSM-102  credit guarantees  to the FSU were  stopped.  Accumulated
arrears by  the FSU under the GSM-102  program  at that  time exceeded  $225 million.  By
February  1993,  arrears  by the FSU under GSM-102  exceeded  $354 million, and the  U.S.
government had  reimbursed  commercial  banks  $125  million.  By March 22,  1993,  defaults
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- - III1In March  1993,  the FSU started  to make payments  to Australia  on outstanding  credit
arrears  of US$50 million under credit arrangements  for grain shipped  in  1991.  Australia
agreed  to extend future credit on a revolving  basis as  long  as payments  on arrears continued.
The Paris Club met on April 2,  1993.4  Its main purpose  was  to alleviate  Russia's
external  debt situation,  estimated  in excess  of $80 billion.  Provisions  were made  to
reschedule  $15  billion of this debt,  which  included  $1 billion of U.S.  GSM-102  credits.
Arrears under  GSM-102 exceeded  $759 million at that time.
In April  1993,  Canada extended  additional  credits  totaling C$200 million,  half of
which reactivated  477,000 tons of wheat  exports under previous agreements  that had been
suspended in  1991.  Further,  the U.S.  extended  a  new aid  package of $1.6  billion of which
$700 million was for the PL-480 Food for Progress program  which was  subject to cargo
preference  requirements  (75 percent  of shipments  to  be carried  on U.S.  vessels).  Since
freight rates for U.S.  vessels exceeded  world rates,  this  reduced  the value  of U.S.  assistance.
Estimates  indicated that  $200 million of the  $700 million would be required  to meet U.S.
shipper's  transportation  costs.
In May  1993,  the  U.S.  and FSU  agreed to split transportation  costs required by
cargo-preference  requirements  of PL-480 for aid  granted in April  1993.  Future grain sales
to  the FSU by  all exporting countries  were expected to remain at 80 percent credit and 20
percent barter trade  (IWC,  April  1993,  p.  1:1-1:4).  Arrears by the FSU under Food and
Freight Credits  from May  1993  to September  1994 are shown by exporting  country  in Table
1 and Figure 5.
By the end of September  1993,  net arrears  under the  GSM-102  program were $1.3
billion.  The United States  and Russia signed the agreement  to reschedule  $1.07  billion in
GSM debt  set out during the Paris  Club meetings  in April of that year.  In the agreement,
Russia  agreed to pay  $444 million in three installments by December  31,  1993.  Payments
were being made  to the U.S.  France,  and Canada in February  1994  (Grain Market Report).
In March  1994,  accumulated  arrears under food and  freight credits  outstanding to  the U.S.,
Canada,  France,  EU,  and  Australia rose to $1,922,  $968,  $508,  $122,  and  $87 million,
respectively  (Figure  5.0).
4The  Paris Club  is a forum  where debtor and creditor  countries meet to  reschedule
international  debt.
23Table  1.  Accumulated  Arrears  Under  Food  and Freight Credits  by the
1993-1994
Former  Soviet Union,
1993  1994
Item/Country  Mar  1  May  1  Aug  1  Feb  1  Jun 1  Sep  1
--------------------------------  (million dollars) ----------------------------
Food Credits
Australia  41  56  87  87  87  87
Austria  --  --  33  33  33  33
Canada  442  539  823  915  1092  1221
EU  --  --  140  96  130  114
EU COFACE  19  305  508  508  727  1017
EU Italy  8  38  68  81  87  104
Germany  - - --  - 223  223
Hungary  3  3  3  20  26  26
Thailand  52  63  63  58  57  57
Turkey  --  --  113  120  120  120
U.S.  448  897  1001  1817  2509  2793
Freight Charges
Third countries  3  5  3  3  3  6
CIS companies  75  78  78  77  68  67
Russian companies  74  38  13  5  6  26
Total  1145  2023  2933  4020  5329  6054
Sources:  IWC  GMR 216  p.1:5 Aug  1993,  Agrokhleb  Sept 1994.
In April  1994,  Russia had again applied to the Paris  Club for rescheduling  of debt
payments  due  in  1994  (Grain Market  Report).  By May 6,  1994,  accumulated  defaults on
GSM  credits by Russia  totaled $2.5 billion.  Russia remained  ineligible for new credits under
the GSM  programs.  Further, CCC was  for the first time examining  extension of GSM
credits to Russia based on the creditworthiness  of Russian banks rather than the Russian
government.  However,  USDA had  not yet acquired  reports from Russian banks  for 1993
that would allow USDA to construct  a private  sector program (Vanderbeek).
On June  5,  1994,  the Paris Club rescheduled  US$7 billion of Russia's debt  to foreign
governments.  Repayment  will  be over  15  years with a three-year  grace period.  This made
Russia  current on payments  for GSM loans  and eligible for further commitments  (Knight
Rider).
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Figure 5. Accumulated Arrears Under Food and Freight Credits
by the Former Soviet Union, by Exporter, Nov. 92 - Mar. 94.
Source:  VAO ExportKhleb, Grain Market Report.
3/94Changing Composition  of Importers
The composition of importing  countries using export credit programs  for wheat and
wheat  flour has undergone  important changes  during  the past two decades.  In this section,
indicators of financial conditions  for wheat  importing  countries are  examined,  and  economic
factors  associated with the use of credit programs  are  identified.
Data Sources and Scope
To provide  some  perspective  on changing  conditions,  selected  financial  indicators
were  collected for countries  importing wheat  in  1973,  1982,  and  1992.  Financial  indicators
examined  included total external  debt,  gross  national product,  exports  of goods and services,
imports  of goods  and  services,  international  reserves,  current account  balance,  total debt
rescheduled,  and Euromoney  risk rating (score).  The  Euromoney  score  is an index  scaled
from  0 to  100,  with  100 representing  highest creditworthiness.  Several ratios were  also
included:  the debt  service ratio  (interest and  amortization relative  to exports of goods and
services),  ratio  of international  reserves to  monthly imports,  ratio of current account
balance  to exports  of goods and  services,  and net debt (external  debt minus international
reserves)  relative to GNP,  net debt relative  to exports  of goods and services;  and proportion
of short-term debt.  Data  were obtained  from the World Tables  and World Debt Tables,
published by  the World Bank.
Rather than comparing  indicators for individual countries,  the analysis  is based  on
weighted  averages.  Two weighting  schemes are utilized.  First,  financial  indicators  are
weighted  by each  importer's share  in total wheat trade.  The result is a weighted average  for
all  wheat importing  countries  (Table 2).  The second scheme contains  a subset of importing
countries that used  credit programs  in a particular year and is  weighted based  on the
importing  country's  share of total  export credits for wheat from major exporting countries
(U.S.,  Canada,  France,  Australia,  Argentina).  Therefore,  this  second scheme portrays
characteristics  for an average  country  importing wheat  under credit guarantees  (Table 3).
Data for deriving trade  weights  were taken from IWC  (1991)  and various  issues of The Grain
Market Report.  Data for credit weights were  obtained from a number of sources,  including
IWC,  Canadian  Wheat Board,  EFIC,  and  USDA-FAS.
26Table  2.  Mean Wheat Importer  Characteristics,
Year,  for Selected  Years*
Weighted by Percent  of Wheat Trade  Per
Year
Item  1973  1982  1992
Dollars Per Capita
Total external debt




Current account  balance





Net debt  ratio
Net debt/GNP ratio
Reserve/imports  ratio
Cur.  account/exports  ratio



















































































* Standard deviation of values are presented  in ().
27Table 3.  Mean Wheat Importer  Characteristics  for Countries Importing  Wheat Under  Credit
Guarantees/Insurance,  Weighted  by Percent  of Wheat Trade Under Credit Per Year,  for
Selected  Years*
Year
Item  1973  1982  1992
Dollars Per Capita
Total  external  debt











Net debt/GNP  ratio
Reserve/imports  ratio
Cur.  account/exports  ratio



















































































* Standard  deviation of values  are presented  in ().
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Table 2  shows  economic  and financial  indicators  (weighted averages)  for all wheat
importing  countries  in  1973,  1982,  and  1992.5  Total external  debt, gross  national product,
current  account balance,  reserves,  exports,  imports,  and reschedulings  are all expressed  in
per capita terms.  Euromoney  rankings  are  index numbers.  Ratios  are  in percentages.
Total external  debt per capita  increased  from $114  in 1973  to $430 in  1982,  the  onset
of the developing country  "debt crisis."  The following  period,  ending  in  1992,  shows  a
small nominal  increase  in external debt to  $539 per capita.  In part,  this  reflects  the changing
composition  of the wheat trade,  i.e.,  shifts in country weights.  Countries  with high per
capita  debt loads accounted  for a smaller fraction of total wheat trade in 1992  than in 1982.
More  revealing  are  the changes  in various ratios.  The debt service  ratio,  a  standard
measure  of debt-servicing  capacity,  shows a  sharp  increase between  1973  and  1982,  from 16
to  25  percent.  It declined  thereafter to  21  percent in 1992,  indicating  an easing of debt
service  relative  to export  earnings.  On the other hand,  net debt ratios (relative to GNP and
to exports)  show further,  moderate  increases  from  1982-1992.  The ratio of reserves to
monthly  imports,  a measure of short-term  liquidity,  showed  little change  over the period,
while  the current  account deficit (relative  to export earnings) was  substantially  reduced  by
1992.
Euromoney  scores  were not available  prior to  1979,  and comparisons  across years are
somewhat  tenuous  in any case  because  of changes  in the method of calculation.  The
weighted  averages  for 1982 and  1992  show  a slight decline  (lower creditworthiness)  between
1982 and  1992.  However,  the standard  deviation  nearly doubled,  indicating  an increased
disparity among  countries.  This reinforces  the mixed impression  left by  changes  in ratios.
Although the  immediate  burden of debt service  appears to have  lessened  by  1992,  there are
few  indications  of dramatic improvement  in creditworthiness,  and,  on some measures,  the
situation worsened  for wheat importing  countries.
5The intent was  to choose  observations  with 10-year  intervals.  However export
credits for wheat were  not utilized  in  1972,  so  1973  was examined  instead.
29Table 3 provides  similar information for the subset of importing  countries that bought
wheat under credit programs  and  is weighted  by the proportion of total wheat credits utilized.
This group has changed  through time.  Thus,  indicators  for different  years reflect  the
changing  composition of importing countries utilizing  credit programs  in addition to changing
economic  conditions.  The  data show (on average)  large increases  in debt loads  for countries
importing wheat under credit.  However,  between  1982  and  1992,  the  ratio of net debt to
exports decreased  from 61%  to 40%,  while the ratio of net debt to GNP decreased  from 65%
to 48%.  The  ratio of reserves to monthly imports  also increased  marginally  from 2.21  to
3.15.  These  three measures  indicated  marked  improvement  in liquidity  that has resulted  in
credit  importers having  similar or marginally better liquidity  than all  wheat importers.  In
addition,  the debt service ratio  declined from 44%  to 36%  from  1982  to 1992,  but  still
remains at  150% of the debt  service  ratio for all wheat  importers.  The  Euromoney  score  in
1992 shows  a slight worsening of creditworthiness  for all countries  importing wheat and  for
countries utilizing credit guarantees,  but the  drop  in creditworthiness  was largest  for
importing  countries  using credit.  Apart from these contradictory  indicators,  the  1992  data
generally  suggest that situations for credit recipients  improved  between  1982  and  1992.
Other  characteristics  of wheat importing countries  provide insight  on prospective  users
of export  credit programs.  Krause  et al.  examined  social  and financial  characteristics  of
wheat importers  in 1989 to identify market  segments.  A cluster analysis  was used to
segment wheat  importing  countries based on standard  of living,  the economic  welfare  of the
nation,  propensity  to trade,  propensity  to  consume,  media  availability,  and degree  of
urbanization.  Their study divided  wheat importing  countries  into  10  clusters.  Interestingly,
countries  importing  wheat under credit guarantees  from Canada,  EU,  and the U.S.  during
1989-1991  fall  into four of these  clusters (Groups  1, 5, 6,  and 7).  Although differing on
other characteristics,  these four  clusters of countries  possess similar  values for many of the
variables  used to quantify  the standard of living.  Countries in these clusters possess
moderate  to low standards  of living with an  average GDP of $825  to $2772 per capita,
average  money  supply of $309  to  $2577 per capita,  average  energy  consumption of 363  to
1647  kg of oil equivalent  per capita,  and  average  caloric consumption  of 2325 to 2947
calories per capita per day.
Krause  et al.  evaluated the potential  to increase  value-added  exports to each of the  10
clusters of wheat importing  countries.  They  indicate that  one of the four groups receiving
imports under export credit programs  [Cluster  1, (Table 4)]  contains  some  of the poorest
countries  in the world.  These are not candidates  for exports of value-added  commodities,
but are  likely  candidates  for exports  of commodities  and intermediate  processed  goods.
Therefore,  countries  in this group could  be potential  users of GSM credits for wheat.  The
remaining  three  groups receiving  wheat imports under credit  guarantees  (Clusters  5,  6,  and
7)  hold the  most potential  for future consumption  of value-added  agricultural  goods.  These
countries  are prospective users of GSM programs  for wheat,  but could  also be targeted  for
sales of value-added  products.
30Table 4.  Country Clusterings












































































Source:  Krause  et al.
31EXPORT  CREDIT PROGRAMS  OF MAJOR GRAIN  EXPORTING COUNTRIES
Export credit guarantee  and/or export credit insurance  programs  are offered by most
major exporting  countries  of agricultural  commodities.  These  programs  typically  cover
political and/or  commercial  risks to exporting  firms.  Programs  for export of agricultural
commodities  are predominately  for short-term coverage  (less than 3 years).  This section
reviews  credit programs  of major exporting countries for  agricultural products.  Program
provisions,  history,  terms,  and procedures  are presented  for most agricultural credit
programs  by exporting  country.
United States Export Credit Programs
The United  States has several programs  that provide export credit guarantees  for
agricultural  products.  The main credit guarantee  programs are GSM-102  and GSM-103,
operated  by the Commodity  Credit Corporation  (CCC).  GSM-102 provides  short-term  (less
than 3 years) and GSM-103  provides medium-term  (3 - 10 years) loan guarantees  for exports
of U.S.  agricultural  products.  In addition,  the CCC has  another program that was authorized
in  1990 that offers  credit guarantees  to emerging democracies.  That program  provides
additional funding  for the  GSM-102  and GSM-103 programs  and  is targeted toward emerging
democracies  in eastern  Europe.  Other credit guarantee  programs  administered  by  CCC are
authorized,  but not operational.  The Foreign Credit Insurance  Association  (FCIA) also
provides export credit insurance that may  be used  to guarantee  direct credit sales made by
the  Export Import Bank of the United  States (Eximbank).  Use of FCIA  guarantees  and
Eximbank direct credit sales for export of agricultural  commodities  from the  U.S.  has been
limited.  The U.S.  also provides concessional  credit sales through P.L. 480 Title I.
GSM-102  and GSM-103
GSM-102  and GSM-103  provide export credit guarantees  for agricultural  commodities
purchased  by  foreign buyers.  GSM-102  was initially  authorized  in  1980 and  is used to grant
short-term  credit of 3 years or less from U.S. banks  at commercial  rates.  Under this
program,  the CCC guarantees  98  percent of the port value plus 4.5 percent  (lowered  to 2.8
percent in July of 1992)  of the accrued interest up to 3 years.  The  Food, Agriculture,
Conservation,  and Trade Act of  1990 made $5 billion available for this program annually.
In fiscal  year  1993,  $5 billion  in credit  guarantees  were  available for this program.
GSM-103  was authorized  in  1985  and is used to grant credit for between  3  and  10
years  at commercial  interest rates.  In this case,  CCC guarantees  98 percent of the port value
and 4.5 percent  of accrued  interest for up to  10 years.  This program  is designed to help
developing  countries make the transition from  concessional  financing to cash purchases.  For
fiscal year  1993,  $500 million in credit guarantees  were available for GSM-103.
32The Food,  Agriculture,  Conservation,  and Trade  act of 1990 modified provisions  of
GSM-102  and GSM-103.  Provisions  of the  Act prohibit the Secretary of Agriculture  from
issuing  export credit  guarantees  to any country  that the Secretary  determines cannot
adequately  service  the debt.  The Act  also prohibits  issuance  of export credit guarantees  for
foreign  aid,  foreign policy,  or debt rescheduling  purposes.  Provisions  suggest a shifting  of
policy  objectives  away  from determination  of allocations  of credit guarantees  based  on export
market potential  and toward limiting  potential  losses incurred by  the programs.  The 1990
Act also  established  a new credit  guarantee  program for emerging democracies.  This  new
program provides  at least $1 billion in additional GSM-102 and  GSM-103  credit guarantees
to promote agricultural  exports  to emerging  democracies  for  1991-1995.  A portion of these
guarantees  can be used  to establish  or improve  handling,  marketing,  processing,  storage,  or
distribution  facilities within emerging  democracies  (Smith et al.,  1991).
In  1982,  a three-year  blended credit program  was implemented  to expand exports.
Under the program,  interest-free  direct government credits  (GSM-5,  described  in a later
section) were  blended  with government  guaranteed  private  credits (GSM-102)  to produce a
lower interest rate.  Credit was  blended  at the ratio of four parts of guaranteed  private credit
(GSM-102)  to one part interest-free  direct credit  (GSM-5).  These  credits were  principally
offered to developing countries  for up to three years.  Blended credit was suspended  in 1985
following a legal  ruling  that it would  be subject to  the Cargo Preference  Act,  which
stipulated  that half of all  government-  impelled shipments  be made  in U.S.  vessels.
Procedures for GSM-102  and GSM-103
Congress  determines the maximum amount of credit exposure  allowed for both GSM-
102  and GSM-103.  Each year,  FAS  establishes  recommendations  for country allocations  of
credit  guarantees.  Foreign  buyers then arrange financing through a U.S.  financial  institution,
purchase  an agricultural  commodity  from a U.S.  exporter,  and  arrange  a letter of credit
issued in favor  of the exporter  by a  CCC-approved foreign bank in the buyer's  country.  The
exporter  applies  for the credit guarantees  from the CCC.  Applications  can be either accepted
as  is,  accepted  with modifications,  or rejected.  After applications  are accepted  and  the
commodity  is shipped,  the exporter  assigns the letter of credit  to the U.S.  financial  institution
in exchange  for cash.  The  foreign bank makes periodic  payments to  the U.S.  financial
institution.  If the foreign bank defaults  on payments  as specified,  within  10  days of the
default,  the U.S.  financial  institution must file a claim with the CCC.  The CCC pays  the
guaranteed  amount to the claimant  who in turn assigns  the delinquent loan to the CCC.
Responsibility  for collection  of loan payments  is then given to the CCC.  Importing  countries
can use all,  a portion,  or none of the credit  guarantees  allocated to their country  for
individual commodities.
Prior to  1990,  FAS  recommendations  for commodity  by country credit allocations
were  made by, assessing  1) marketing possibilities  in individual  countries,  as assessed by  the
commodity  divisions in the  Commodity  and Marketing Programs  (C&MP),  2)  limits for
33foreign banks  as determined  by CCC,  and 3) Trade and Economic  Information Division
(TEID) country  risk profiles.  However,  during  this  time,  decisions on GSM-102,  GSM-103
allocations  relied  almost exclusively  on market potential.  In 1990,  procedures were  changed
so that information from CCC assessments  of foreign banks  and risk profiles  of TEID
increased  in importance  in the decision-making  process  for commodity  by country allocations
of credit.  Procedures  were  changed  again in 1993  (USDA-FAS,  1990,  1993).
Each year TEID generates  country credit risk profiles  from May to September  and
updates  them if required.  Credit risk profiles use three analytical  procedures  to determine
key risk elements:
1.  A country  risk letter grade,  based upon the  country's willingness  and ability  to
service its  foreign debt in a timely  manner.  Grades range  from A-F with
designations  of +  or - to  indicate  a borderline  case or that conditions  are
changing.
2.  A country  profile which analyzes  economic,  financial,  political,  and social
conditions.
3.  An  annual credit exposure  guideline,  which provides  a means of limiting  risk
based on current economic,  financial,  and political  conditions.
Each year,  starting  in July,  the FAS Reconciliation  Committee  meets monthly  to
review country credit risk profiles and  decide on allocation  levels for countries being
analyzed.  Eligible countries must offer potential for long-term market  development  and have
debt or foreign  exchange  reserve situations which  offer reasonable  prospects  for repayment,
but with repayment  risks greater than private U.S.  banks will tolerate.  FAS
recommendations  are  sent to the National  Advisory  Council  on International  Monetary  and
Financial Policies for review and advice.  The National Advisory  Council  is composed  of
members of the Departments of Agriculture,  State,  Treasury,  and Commerce;  the  U.S.  Trade
Representative;  the Federal  Reserve;  the Export-Import  Bank;  and the International
Development  Cooperative  Agency.  When approved  by the National  Advisory  Council,  FAS
announces each  country by  commodity  credit guarantee  allocations for the year (USDA-FAS,
1990).
New Provisions  for GSM-102,  GSM-103  Established in 1993
The decision-making  process for allocating  GSM  guarantees  was modified in 1993.
Procedures  for analysis of risk assessment  were modified  so  that they  are more  in line with
current practices  for risk assessment  in the  financial  industry.  General  responsibilities  and
procedures  for determination of credit  allocations  are  as follows:
34a.  FAS Program  Development Division  (PDD) develops  country  program
allocations  from information  derived from Trade and Economic  Information
Division (TEID),  Commodity  and Marketing Programs  (C&MP),  Program
Analysis  Division (PAD),  and the  Financial  Management Division  of the
Agricultural  Conservation  and Stabilization  Service  (FMD).
b.  TEID provides  country risk assessments.
c.  C&MP provides  reports  which recommend  country programming  levels based
on market potential.
d.  PAD is the Reconciliation Committee  Coordinator  and  maintains historical
GSM program usage data and  compiles  country  packets.
e.  FMD provides  assessments  of eligibility  for participation  by foreign banks.
f.  Directors of PDD,  TEID.  C&MP,  and FMD  and other senior  officials within
FAS  sit on the reconciliation  committee.  This committee determines  the
appropriate  level of programming  for potential  country participants  based on
initial  recommendations.
g.  Depending on risk grade,  size of guarantee,  and percentage  the
recommendation  exceeds  the annual exposure  guideline,  higher USDA  officials
may  review  the decision.  Otherwise,  the decision of the reconciliation
committee  is  sent to the National  Advisory  Council.  When approved,  results
are published.
In the TEID risk analysis,  a general  background  report and qualitative  reports are
generated  that examine  the country's political  situation,  macroeconomic  environment,  balance
of payments,  liquidity,  foreign debt burden,  and debt repayment  history.  A quantitative
analysis  is used to assess risk using  a risk rating model which establishes  a baseline letter
grade.  Procedures  for the quantitative  analysis were modified  in 1993.  This  analysis now
focuses on 13  variables  in the  areas of macroeconomic  environment,  balance  of payments,
liquidity,  foreign debt burden,  and debt repayment  history.  New to the TEID analysis  is  an
annual  exposure  guideline.  This guideline  is established  by assessing IMF quota,  risk grade,
liquidity,  confidence  factor,  and analysis  of reserves.  Annual  exposure  guidelines  can be
adjusted  based on cumulative  exposure  analysis  and adjustments  (total exposure  for a
country),  previous fiscal year's  guideline,  private  versus public  sector borrowing,  and type  of
GSM credit.  Final  letter grades  are adjusted up  or down from baseline letter grades based
on qualitative risk reports,  comparisons  with private  sector  ratings (Euromoney,  Institutional
Investor)  and Interagency  Country Risk Assessment  System risk grades  (group headed  by
office of Management  and Budget with representatives  from  the Departments  of State,
Treasury,  Eximbank,  AID,  USDA,  and other  agencies),  and annual  exposure  guidelines.
35Annual exposure  guidelines  are used  to limit cumulative exposure  to high risk
countries.  A total exposure  guideline  is set at 200 percent of the annual exposure  guideline.
If cumulative  exposure exceeds  the total exposure  guideline,  then that country  is specified  as
overexposed  and further  analysis  is required to determine  if there should be  adjustments.
For cumulative  exposures from  200 to  300 percent of annual guidelines,  adjustments are
small.  If cumulative  exposure  under the  GSM programs exceeds  300 percent of annual
exposure  levels,  then strategies  to  limit overexposure  become  more drastic  and can  include
limits on extension  of credit,  shortening of terms,  and/or receiving  payments  on existing
loans before granting  new ones.  These measures  are particularly  important  if there  are also
other unfavorable  conditions,  e.g.,  low  letter grades  (USDA-FAS,  1993).
Both GSM-102  and GSM-103  require  a fee paid by the importer.  Fees  range from
0.15  percent to 0.67  percent of the guaranteed  value of exports under  GSM-102,  to  1.5
percent to 2.67 percent under GSM-103.  Coverage  does not include c.i.f. or c&f, except to
match competing countries'  offers  or if the  U.S.  cannot compete  without covering  freight.  In
practice,  the vast majority of exports under GSM guarantees  are on an f.o.b.  basis.  All U.S.
agricultural  products  are eligible  for export under GSM-102 and GSM-103.  Initially,  4.5
percent of interest  was covered.  In July  1992,  the maximum  interest covered  was reduced to
2.8 percent.  Interest  rates  charged under GSM-102  and GSM-103  are prime rate or LIBOR
(London  Interbank  Offer Rate).  This is less than rates  charged  without the credit guarantee
because the  financing bank  assumes  less risk.
Interest rates were  fixed for the term of the loan until  September 26,  1994,  when
CCC  announced a new  adjustable  interest rate  for both the Fiscal  Year 1995  GSM-102  and
GSM-103  programs.  The adjustable  rate is  fixed for a period of one  year based on the 52-
week rate  for Treasury  bills and  is  adjusted annually.  Rates for GSM-102  and GSM-103  are
not  to exceed  55  percent and 80 percent respectively,  of the  average  investment rate of the
most  recent Treasury 52-week  bill auction prior to the date  rates  are adjusted.
GSM-5  Direct Export Credit
In 1956,  the USDA  implemented the  GSM-5  credit program under Commodity  Credit
Corporation  (CCC)  authority.  This program was  initially  authorized  in 1956 and  was  in
operation  from  1956 to  1980 and  1984.  Under  GSM-5,  the CCC  acted directly  as the lender
for foreign  purchases  of U.S.  commodities.  Initially,  all  sales  were made out of CCC
stocks.  In  1965,  CCC was  authorized to purchase private  stocks for direct credit sales.
Interest rates  charged were  initially  higher than CCC's cost of borrowing  from the Treasury
and later changed  to .5  to  1.5 percentage points  above the  U.S.  prime rate.  In  1984,  it was
set at 1.5 percentage  points  higher than rates  paid by the Treasury  on 52-week  Treasury
bills.  Maturities  varied between 6  and  36 months.  The  GSM-5 program  is authorized,  but
has not been operational  from  1985  to the present.
36GSM-101,  GSM-201,  GSM-301
The Agricultural  Trade Act of  1978 authorized  the credit programs  GSM-101,  GSM-
201,  and GSM-301.  GSM-101  (The  Non-Commercial  Risk Assurance  Program)  provided
credit guarantees  for noncommercial  risks  such as foreign  import embargoes,  wars,  or the
freezing  of foreign exchange.  It provided credit through commercial  institutions  for 6 to 36
months.  CCC guaranteed  98 percent  of the principal  and  interest up to  a maximum of 8
percent per year.  The exporter was required  to pay  a guarantee  fee  to CCC.  This program
was  in operation from  1979 to  1981  when it was merged  into GSM-102.
GSM-201  and GSM-301  were  intermediate term  (3-10 years) direct credit programs.
GSM-201  was authorized  for sales of breeding  animals  and GSM-301  for financing market
infrastructure.  Both programs  were authorized in  1993,  but are  not operational.
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.
The  Export-Import  Bank was established  in 1934 to  grant direct  loans to  exporters
and guarantee  private  credits for export sales.  Its mission was  to promote  U.S.  exports,
compete  with foreign officially  supported  export financing,  and supplement private export
financing.  In 1961,  the bank created the Foreign Credit Insurance  Association  (FCIA).  The
FCIA is  a composite  of 50 private  insurance companies  operating under the Export-Import
Bank umbrella.  The  FCIA provides  export credit  insurance  for political  and commercial
risks to exporters  and  their banks.  FCIA relies  largely  on opinions of the  bank involved,
major banks,  private rating  firms like  Dun and Bradstreet,  and Berne  Union to determine
when to  extend credit guarantees.  Premiums for FCIA guarantees  are  based on the type  and
length  of the  loan,  the type of buyer,  and  the credit rating  of the buyer.  Rates increase  as
firms are classified  from government buyers  to private  buyers.  Since  1979,  guarantees  have
required  a  15  percent downpayment  and  will guarantee  only 90 percent of the commercial
risk.  Guarantees  for some  agricultural  exports can be increased  to cover 98 percent of the
risk.
The Export-Import  Bank grants  loans primarily for purchases  of capital  goods,  and
loans for agricultural exports  have been  limited.  A sizeable  portion of the Export-Import
Bank's exposure  in agriculture has been for exports  of cotton and tobacco.  It has  also
focused on financing  foreign production  of sugar.  Export insurance  for agricultural
commodities  are extended under a  variety  of Export-Import  Bank programs.  Insurance  is  for
360 days  and covers  100 percent of the political and 98 percent of the commercial  risk and
interest up to the U.S.  Treasury  rate plus  1 percent.  Premiums for Eximbank credit
insurance  range from  .03 to 4.9 percent of the  export value.  Export loans  and guarantees  for
agricultural  commodities by the  Export-Import  Bank from  1934  to  the present have formed
only  a minor percentage of total Export-Import  Bank loans  and have  generally been less than
$100  million dollars per year (Ackerman  and Smith).
37P.L.  480 6
All the major exporting countries  (Canada,  Australia,  EU,  Argentina)  have  food aid
programs,  as do other highly  developed  countries like  Japan.  The U.S.  provides subsidized
credit  sales to needy  countries under P.L. 480 Title  I.  Grants  to needy  countries  are
provided under P.L. 480 Title II.  The  U.S.  is the only country that provides  a portion of
food  aid as concessional  financing.  Other countries  only provide  food aid as grants.
P.L. 480  was  established in 1954  from  a combination of credit and  aid programs.
P.L. 480 contains  three titles.  Title  I was initially  authorized  for credit sales to foreign
countries with payments received  in foreign currency.  This title  was  initiated to allow
purchases of commodities by foreign countries  who were  previously not able to purchase
because  of the inconvertibility  of their currencies.  Initially,  loans were made for 3 to 5 years
at market  interest rates.  Loans were  repaid assuming  a  fixed exchange rate.  This provided  a
foreign exchange  subsidy to recipient countries  if their currencies  depreciated.  Currencies
were accumulated  by  the United States in foreign countries  and used to partly  defray U.S.
expenses  in that country.  Title  I  sales required  countries  to pay for shipping.  On shipments
under Cargo Preference requirements,  the recipient  country  was required  to pay shipping
costs  equivalent to rates for shipment aboard  foreign vessels and not the higher  shipping  costs
for U.S.  vessels.
Title II  allowed donation of commodities  to meet famine  and other extraordinary
relief requirements.  Food aid  under this title was in the form of government-to-government
grants  where various  voluntary and  international  food agencies took over allocation and
distribution within recipient  countries.  On Title II  shipments,  the recipient country  does not
pay for shipping,  but is responsible  for the costs of internal  distribution of commodities.
Title III  was initially authorized  for barter trade  in strategic  goods with food needy  countries.
Title  IV was added  to PL 480 in  1959.  This allowed  long-term  credit sales of surplus
CCC agricultural  commodities  for U.S.  dollars.  Terms of sale  included up to  a  10-year
delivery  schedule  for agricultural  commodities purchased  on credit,  with a  maximum term of
20 years.  This title was initiated because  the United  States could  not find  ways to spend  all
the foreign currencies  it was  accumulating under  Title I.  Countries  where  the U.S. was
accumulating  foreign currencies  were  encouraged  to accept dollar credit sales  instead of sales
for foreign  currency.
In  1960,  Title II was  modified to  permit donation of CCC inventories  for economic
development  and  self-help  activities within recipient  countries.  It also authorized
contributions  under  Title II to the World  Food Program of the  United Nations.
6Much of the information  in this section  is based on Cochrane  and  Ryan, Tarrant,
Smith et al.,  and Ackerman and  Smith.
38In 1963,  the Title III  barter trade effort to obtain strategic  materials had obtained
significant  stockpiles,  and the program  was used to procure goods for the U.S.  military  and
foreign assistance  agencies overseas.  Prior to  1963,  barter trade involved CCC  stocks  in
inventory.  After  1963,  private  stocks  were exported under authority of the CCC Charter
Act.  The barter trade program portion of Title III was  suspended  in 1973.  Foreign barter
sales  were made  again with Jamaica  in 1982-1984.
In 1966,  modifications  to P.L. 480 incorporated  Title IV  long-term dollar credit sales
into Title I.  Long-term credit sales  for foreign currencies  that were convertible  were
authorized,  and  a transition to dollar credit  sales was  initiated.  At this  time,  recipient
countries  signing  agreements  under the convertible currencies  provisions of Title I had a
maximum term of 40 years to repay their loans.  Recipient  countries were  required  to put
down a deposit of 5 percent of the  value of the loan upon signing  a PL 480 agreement.  By
1973,  dollar credit  sales  had totally displaced  sales  for foreign currencies.  In  1968,  foreign
currencies  collected under Title  I were authorized  for investment  in local  self help and other
development  programs.
In the  period  1973-1975,  U.S.  and world stocks of commodities  were drawn down,
causing  the United  States to  evaluate  how much and to  whom food  aid should be distributed.
In  1973-1974,  70 percent of concessional  sales  were required to go to countries  most affected
by  food  shortages  as designated  by the United Nations.  In  1975,  this  was increased  to 75
percent  and special  attention was directed  toward increasing  agricultural  production in
countries  with under $300 annual per capita  income.
In 1975,  a minimum  level of 1.3 million tons  of agricultural commodities  was
authorized to be distributed  under the  Food for Peace  (Title II) program.  This minimum
level has  subsequently  been raised numerous  times under succeeding  legislation (1985
legislation changed  the minimum  to  1.9 million tons for 1987-90)  (Ackerman  and Smith).
Title III was  reactivated  in 1977  as the Food for Development  Program to reinforce
self-help  development  provisions enacted  in the  1966 revision of P.L. 480.  Countries  were
encouraged  to use  proceeds  from sales  of Title I  commodities to support agricultural  and
rural development projects,  nutrition and  health services,  and population planning.
Eligibility  for 75  percent of concessional  aid was changed  to the  1977 poverty  level
established  by the International  Development  Association.
In 1985,  P.L. 480 was  amended  to allow repayment  of long-term loans under  Title I
with foreign currencies.  Commodities  sold  for foreign currencies  or donations  were required
to be shipped on U.S.  vessels.
Other  aspects  of P.L. 480 were  changed again in the  1990 Farm Bill.  Administration
of Title I  is now under the direction  of the Secretary  of Agriculture.  Titles  II and  III are
under  the direction of USAID.  Title  I now contains  provisions  for debt forgiveness,  and
concessional  sales are  to continue  for  those countries  which have  the ability  to repay,
39demonstrate  the greatest need,  and  have potential  of becoming  markets  for U.S.
commodities.  Title I concessional  sales are  no longer required  to have  75  percent of
allocations  directed to countries  defined as  the poorest.  Credit terms  were decreased  to a
maximum  of 30  years with up to a 7-year  grace period,  from 40 years with  a  10-year  grace
period.  Loans can be obtained  with payments  in U.S.  dollars or foreign currencies.  Title II
provides  grants  of agricultural  commodities  through government  and private organizations  to
combat  hunger and for emergency food  aid.
Cargo  preference  laws for Title II grants  were modified  and now require  that 50
percent of the bagged,  processed,  or fortified commodities  be shipped  on a  lowest landed-
cost basis,  regardless  of the vessel's  country  of registration.  New  provisions also allow
shipments  on vessels  designated  as American  Great Lakes vessels to be  counted toward cargo
preference  requirements.  Title III  allows government-to-government  grants of commodities
to developing  countries  to be used  for direct  feeding programs and building emergency  food
reserves.  This title also allows  for Title I loans to be forgiven  if the commodities  are sold
and all the  local currencies  generated  are used for specified  development projects.  Countries
receiving  aid under Title  III must
"demonstrate the  greatest  food need,  the capacity  to use  food aid effectively,  and  a
commitment  to policies to  promote food  security,  and to those countries  that have a
long-term plan for broad-based,  equitable,  and  sustainable development."  (Smith et
al.,  p.  66).
Canadian Export Credit Programs
Canada provides  guaranteed  credit through  the Canadian Wheat Board  and the Export
Development  Corporation.  The Canadian Wheat  Board  (CWB)  has offered direct credit sales
since  1952.  In  1968,  the  CWB was  authorized  to extend  credit guaranteed by the  Minster of
Finance.  Currently,  credit sales are extended by the  CWB under the Credit Grain Sales
Program.  Loans  are available  for  100 percent  Canadian origin wheat  and barley  (the only
grains  marketed by the  CWB).  CWB  finances  sales  at market rates borrowed  from  Canadian
chartered  banks for maturities  from 6 to 36 months.  Credit lines  are guaranteed  in full by
the Minister  of Finance  and  offered in either Canadian or U.S. dollars.  Credit guaranteed
sales  are only made to  importers  who have  obtained  a sovereign  guarantee from their
importing  country.  This nationalizes  the debt and provides  the Canadian Wheat
Board/Minister  of Finance recourse against the importing country  if the importing  firm
defaults.  However,  this arrangement  was changed  within the  1995  budget,  in particular $1
billion of sales will be provided to non-sovereign  buyers of Canadian Wheat  Board wheat,
barley  and other Agri-food products.
Credit is allocated  to countries on a revolving  credit line.  Countries may  borrow
against this  credit line until  the credit ceiling  for a country  is reached.  Then new  loans are
granted only after payments  on loans extended  are  made.  A maximum  ceiling  on all credit
40lines for all countries  is also present.  However,  this ceiling  has far exceeded  loan activity
throughout  the history  of the program.
Country credit allocations  are determined  by  the following process.  Throughout the
year,  the  Canadian  Wheat Board  identifies countries  where  it thinks  it can conduct business
under the  Credit Grain Sales  Program.  This  information  is conveyed  to the Department  of
Finance  which undertakes  a creditworthiness  study  of importing  countries.  This incorporates
many of the same  creditworthiness  criteria used by U.S.  officials  in the GSM-102 and GSM-
103  programs.  Recommendations  for  country credit allocations  are assessed quarterly by  a
committee  composed  of members  from  the Departments  of Finance,  Agriculture  and Agri-
Foods,  and Foreign Affairs  and International  Trade,  and  the Canadian Wheat Board.  This
committee  makes  recommendations  on credit allocations  which are forwarded  to the
Department  of Finance  where they must be  ratified (Stewart).
CWB credit can be specified  in U.S.  or Canadian dollars.  U.S.  dollar credit  is
borrowed  in the Euro-dollar market  at LIBOR  rates.  Credit in Canadian dollars  is specified
as  .0025  percent below  the most favored  customer rate.  No fee  is required for participation
in the Credit Grain Sales Program,  but a down payment is required.  The size  of the down
payment  varies  with the credit risk of the importer.  Commonly,  3-year  credit has required a
10 percent  downpayment  with the balance  being paid  in 3 annual  installments.  Credit  sales
are typically  made on an f.o.b.  basis.  Inclusion of c&f or c.i.f. reduces  the amount of credit
sale  on a dollar-per-dollar  basis and  is made only  to counter similar terms  offered by
competing  countries.  Although the  CWB offers credit,  greater emphasis  has been placed on
price  as a means of maintaining export market shares  in recent  years (GAO,  1992b).
The Export Development  Corporation  (EDC) provides  short term  (1-3  years)
guarantees  for both agricultural  and non-agricultural  exports.  It is  authorized  to guarantee
credit,  extend intermediate  term credit (3-10 years),  and  subsidize  interest rates.  However,
the EDC has  not subsidized  interest rates or provided  intermediate  credit  since  1972.  Credit
guarantees  of less  than one year cover 95 percent  of the principal  and interest  and  100
percent for purchases  by foreign governments.  Credit guarantees  with terms up to 3 years
are only  available  as responses  to foreign competitors  who are using  similar credit
guarantees.  Credit guarantees are offered  at commercial  interest rates  and include  a fee of
0.5 to  1.5  percent and  a C$1,000 processing  fee  (Harris) (Table 5).
Argentina Export Credit Programs
The Argentina Central  Bank grants  limited credit,  not exceeding  12  months,  to Latin
American countries.  Peru and Cuba have been the only markets utilizing  this credit
program.  Credit programs have  been mostly geared  toward economic  assistance and,  due  to
financial constraints,  are  sporadic.  Argentina  has chosen to  compete against other exporting
countries'  credit terms by offering  lower prices (Harris,  IWC).
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Credit  sales of Australian agricultural  commodities  are provided on a  limited basis by
the Australian  Wheat Board  (AWB).  AWB credit  sales  increased during  the  1980s to meet
credit use by competing  exporting countries.  AWB credit  is guaranteed by the Export
Finance  and  Insurance corporation  (EFIC),  a public  agency under supervision  of the
Australian  Trade  Commission's  (AUSTRADE) Export Credits  Division.  EFIC  also
provides  insurance and direct loans for non-wheat exports.  However  no direct loans are
currently  made for agricultural  exports.
EFIC guarantees  payment of 75 percent  of the principal and interest for AWB  credit,
while the AWB  covers  100 percent of the export value.  Thus,  the AWB  and ultimately the
Australian wheat growers bear a portion of the costs  of credit programs  in Australia.  If
EFIC determines  insurance,  loan, or credit guarantees  to a given country  are commercially
inappropriate,  EFIC  may appeal  to the Minister for Industry,  Technology  and Commerce  for
a National  Interest Cover.  If granted,  the  Australian government  assumes  100 percent of the
risk for amounts  covered by EFIC.  For high risk loans under National Interest  cover,  EFIC
only covers  80 percent of the export value.
Terms for EFIC insurance  are up to 3 years.  National Interest coverage  carries  2 to
3-year terms.  All  countries  are eligible  for EFIC insurance  except  South Africa.  Countries
are ranked for risk on a  scale  from A to D.  Some countries  are under discretionary  limits on
the amount of coverage  or receive less coverage.  EFIC insurance premiums  for exporters
range from  .2 to 2 percent,  depending  on risk and  payment timing.  Premiums  for exports
under National  Interest coverage  are A$2.28 per hundred  for all countries  except Egypt and
Iraq,  whose  premiums  were raised  to A$2.73  in  1987.  Coverage  levels are  85  percent of the
export value  for all  countries  except Egypt and Iraq,  where coverage  is 80 percent.
Premiums  for National Interest coverage  are paid  for the  exporter by the AWB.  Interest
rates for credit sales  by the AWB are commercial  rates.  However,  loans obtaining credit
guarantees  receive  more favorable rates due to removal  of much of the political  and
commercial  risk (Harris).
42Table  5.  Terms  and Conditions  of Export Credit Programs  of Major  Exporting Countries.
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U.K. ECGDEU Export Credit Programs
Prior to credit  extensions by the EU to the Former  Soviet Union  in  1991,  the EU as a
unit did not grant credit for exports  of grain.  Some of the  member states maintained  credit
programs  for grain exports.  For example,  France  (COFACE)  has granted  credit for up to 3
years to traditional  markets  such as Egypt,  Tunisia,  and Morocco.  This action was
motivated  by the need to match credit terms  offered by competing  suppliers,  namely  the
United  States.  Credit has been granted  to these markets at market interest rates,  with a
COFACE  guarantee  of 95 percent  of the  total amount.  The  stated objective  of these credit
arrangements  was  not to increase  market shares,  but to maintain traditional  markets.
However,  recent  sales under COFACE credit have  been made  to  Bulgaria and Romania.
France-COFACE  7
France has helped  exporters finance  agricultural  sales  since  1946  through the semi-
private Company  for International  Trade  Insurance  (la  compagnie Francaise  D'assurance
pour le  Commerce  Exterieur (COFACE)).  The French Government  has controlling  interest
in COFACE through  majority ownership  of shares.  COFACE provides short-term
commercial  risk insurance  for terms of less than 3 years  and intermediate  insurance  (3 to 7
years) for political  and commercial  risk.  Terms for insurance can be stretched  to  10 years to
meet competitors'  offers.  COFACE credit guarantees  for grain exports  are designed  to
compete  directly with  the U.S.  credit guarantees  (GSM-102,  GSM-103).  All countries  are
eligible to receive  credit under COFACE.  Eligible agricultural  products  are limited to those
containing  up to 40 percent foreign content  (commodities  of foreign origin) from other EU
countries,  up to  30 percent  foreign content of non-EU  origin grain if the country  has a
reciprocal  agreement  with France,  and up to  10 percent foreign content  with no  agreement.
Credit  guarantees  can cover 90  to 95  percent of the principal  and interest  for grain
exports.  Exports  must be  shipped  on a French flag vessel or under  a French  bill of lading
and insured by  a French insurance  agency  if freight  is included  in the coverage  or shipment
is on a c&f or c.i.f. basis.  Premiums  for COFACE guarantees  are  calculated  as  a percentage
of the  maximum value of the contract,  including  the upper tolerance  level.  Premiums for 3
and 7-year credit are 0.67  and  2.67 percent,  respectively,  of the maximum  value of the
contract plus 5 percent.  Premiums are  usually paid by the  exporter,  but are normally
reflected  in the price to the importer.  Credit guarantees  may  include  an exchange  rate
guarantee  if desired  for an additional premium.  Terms for COFACE  guarantees  vary across
importing  countries  according  to political  considerations,  import needs,  and the country's
repayment record.
7Much  of the  following  information is based  on Harris;  IWC  1988,  1990;  and Smith,
1988.
44COFACE guarantees are under the direction  of the Directorate  for External  Economic
Relations,  which is jointly  administered  by the Ministries  of Trade  and Finance,  and by the
Commission for Credit Guarantees  for Foreign Trade,  which is chaired by  representatives  of
the Ministries  of Trade,  Finance  and Foreign  Affairs,  the  Bank of France,  COFACE,  and the
French Bank for International  Trade.  To  obtain COFACE guarantees,  countries negotiate  a
protocol agreement,  which is signed by  the participating  government  and the French
government.  The  importing  country bank and  a committee of French banks sign a financial
accord.  Normally,  the guaranteed  loan principal is repaid  in equal annual  installments,  and
interest  is repaid semi-annually.  French banks  will usually  repay a grain exporter in full  at
the time of shipment,  making good on the guaranteed  payment,  although this practice  is not
authorized  by the French  government.
Interest rates  for credit  sales are typically  either Paris Inter-Bank  Offer Rate  (PIBOR)
for loans  to be  repaid in French Francs  or LIBOR rates for sales to be repaid  in U.S.
dollars.  Credit  sales  are made  by commercial  banks  or the Banque  Francaise du Commerce
Exterieur  (BFCE).  Medium to  long-term  credit  sales are financed  directly  by the BFCE on
behalf of the  French government.  Short-term credit is  financed by commercial  banks.
COFACE can  obtain refinancing from one  or more  of a  consortium of banks.  No down
payments  are  required for COFACE guarantees.
COFACE has been under pressure to reduce  loan losses  for credit guarantees  since
the  late  1980s.  Since  1989,  COFACE has required that countries repay most or all of their
arrears  before obtaining  further credit guarantees  (Harris).  COFACE  guarantees  for Egypt
were  suspended  in 1990  (IWC).
Germany-HERMES  KREDITVERSICHERUNGS-AG
The Federal  Republic  of Germany provides  export credit guarantees  to German
exporters to  safeguard against commercial  and political  risks (HERMES).  The German
government provides guarantees  up to an exposure  limit set annually by parliament.  Credit
guarantees  are  managed  by HERMES  Kreditversicherungs-AG  and Treuarbeit
Aktiengesellschaft.  HERMES  guarantees  had  limited use for agricultural  commodities until
1991,  when credit was used to  facilitate  export of large stocks  of wheat,  barley,  and flour
from East Germany  to Russia.  Future use is also seen  as limited  with Russia or the other
former Soviet Republics  as  the only  potential  recipients.  Another future potential  use  of
HERMES  is to  insure  non-delivery  risk of barter trade transactions  with Russia.  Type of
coverage  varies with the destination  and needs of the exporter.  No risk classifications  are
made,  and  fees are not based on higher  or lower  risk.  Terms  are flexible  with coverage  up
to 3 years.  Credit guarantees  are  obtained by arranging  a letter of credit among  the
exporter,  importer,  and German  creditors subject  to successful  review  by HERMES  and  the
Interministerial  Committee  for Export Guarantees.  The Interministerial  Committee  is
composed of representatives  from the  Ministries  of Economics,  Finance,  Foreign Affairs,
and Economic  Cooperation (Wenberg).
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The Interministerial  Committee  for Foreign Economic  Policy  (CIPES) administers  all
loans and grants supported  by the Italian government.  CIPES  is chaired  by the Ministry  of
Foreign Affairs and  includes the Ministries  of Budget,  Treasury,  Agriculture and Forestry,
Industry  and Commerce,  and Foreign Trade.  CIPES  directs the Special  Section  for Export
Credit Insurance  (SACE),  which administers Italian export credit guarantees.  Export credit
guarantees  are authorized  for medium  to long-term  credit exports of agricultural
commodities.  However,  credit guarantees  in the late  1980s were  not granted for terms more
than 2 years.  SACE  covers 90 percent of the political  and commercial  risk for supplier
credits.  SACE also covers  95  percent of the  political  and commercial  risk for buyer credits.
Buyer credits  involving inter-governmental  transactions  can cover  100 percent of the risk.
Premiums  for export credit  guarantees  range  from  1.6 to 5.4 percent and require  a down
payment  of 15  percent  of the  principal.  All agricultural  commodities  are eligible for credit
guarantees,  but the foreign content  of exports may not exceed the  15  percent down payment.
The government  of Italy  also provides  direct export credit under Mediocredito
Centrale.  Mediocredito  Centrale  is  a publicly  chartered  and financed  institution that will
both finance direct export  credit at commercial  rates and  refinance export credits  made by
medium-term  credit institutions  to Italian exporters at concessional rates.  Direct export
credit  is provided for up to  85 percent  of the value  of exports for terms of 18 months or
longer.  Mediocredito  Centrale  can  also provide  interest  subsidies when they  are not the
issuer of credit or refinancing.
United Kingdom  9
The  United Kingdom provides  credit guarantees through two government programs
administered  through  the Department of Trade and Industry's Export Credit Guarantee
Department  (ECGD).  The Short  Term Comprehensive  Guarantee  provides credit guarantees
for credit terms up to  180 days.  This program offers combined coverage  for up to 90
percent commercial  and 95 percent political  risk.  If ECGD considers a public buyer or
finance  house  as reputable,  it can cover 95 percent of commercial  and political  risk.
The other program  is the Supplemental  Extended Terms  Guarantee.  This program
was  initiated  in 1985  and provides  guarantees  for exports of bulk grains.  It provides export
credit guarantees  for credit  sales with a term of 2 years,  but may be stretched  to 3 years to
meet competitors  programs.  Risk coverage  is  the same  as the Short Term  Comprehensive
8Much of this information  is based on Harris.
9Much of the following  information  is based  on Harris and  IWC  1988,  1990.
46Guarantee.  To  obtain a Supplemental  Extended Terms Guarantee,  one must first obtain a
Short Term Comprehensive  Guarantee.
Premiums  for both programs  range from  .5 to  1.5 percent of the total value.  The
Supplemental  Extended  Terms Guarantee  requires  a  15 percent  down payment.  Premiums
for the  Supplemental  Extended  Terms  Guarantee  vary  from 1 percent for 2 year terms  with
low risk to 3 percent for 3-year terms with high risk.  Interest on credit guaranteed  loans are
LIBOR rates  plus an agreed margin.
Other programs  guaranteeing  credit in the  U.K. include  bank guarantees,  existing
credit line guarantees,  and  insurance  through private banks.  Export credit guarantees may  be
supplemented  by  guarantees  to the exporter's bank.  This guarantee covers  100 percent of the
value of the loan,  but the exporter  is responsible  for 5 to  10 percent of the contract value  in
the case of default.  Premiums are  25  pence per UKL  100.  Interest  rates are  .625  percent
over the bank's base  rate.
Existing  lines  of credit at U.K. banks  can be guaranteed by the  ECGD.  With an
existing line of credit guarantees,  the  buyer is required to pay  a  15 percent down payment
directly to the exporter,  and the UK bank pays the remaining  85  percent.
Insurance  for Extended  Terms Guarantees  can be obtained  from U.K. banks by
purchasing  Finance  Contracts  Endorsements  (FINCOBE).  The use of FINCOBEs  allows
exporters to  obtain credit guarantees  through U.K.  banks rather than approaching  ECGD.
With a FINCOBE guarantee,  the exporter pays a  down payment  of 15  percent directly to the
exporter,  and the U.K.  bank pays the remaining  85  percent.
THE SUBSIDY  VALUE  OF CREDIT GUARANTEES
The extension of credit guarantees,  by reducing  risks to lenders,  makes  it possible  for
importers  to borrow  at lower  than commercial  interest rates.  Thus, credit guarantees  provide
an implicit interest subsidy.  The implicit  subsidy in export  credit guarantee/insurance
programs has been estimated for a range  of programs  and time periods  (Baron, Abraham,
Raynauld,  among  others);  GSM programs  are the focus of Skully  and Hyberg  et al.  Most
of these studies  have  focused on officially  supported  export credit  insurance/guarantees  of
commercial products  falling under OECD agreements,  although  Skully estimated  subsidies
for both GSM and PL 480 programs.  This section reviews  methodologies  for measuring  the
interest  subsidies implied by credit guarantees  and presents  results from previous  studies.
Implicit subsidies  are estimated for GSM-102  credit guarantees  for  specific importing
countries  and years.
47Previous Studies Estimating Export Credit Guarantee Subsidies
Baron analyzed  levels  of subsidies  for Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the
United Kingdom and  the U.S.  for officially  supported export credits  (sources  of information
included  studies done  by Eximbank).  Baron indicates that the implicit subsidy  depends on
the alternative,  commercial credit  rate facing  the borrower.  The  implicit subsidy  is
measured  as:
Implicit Subsidy  =  (1 - r/i) [1  - (e'M  - ei
T  )/(i(T - M))]  (1)
where
r is the Eximbank  lending  rate,
i is the market rate  of interest,
e is the base of the natural logarithm,
T is the term of the loan,  and
M is the length of moratorium  on payments.
Total  implied subsidies  are estimated by multiplying  the subsidy  rate by the  loan principal.
Baron applied  this methodology  to the measurement  of subsidies  for Eximbank  credit
programs  in 1979-1981.  He measured  subsides for Eximbank  direct credits for
Agriculture/construction,  Communication,  Manufacturing,  Mining/refining,  Power,  Aircraft,
Other  Transportation,  and Miscellaneous  sectors.  Subsidies over this period ranged  from
18.36 percent  to  29 percent  of the value of the  loan.  The subsidy  for direct Eximbank  loans
from  1979-1981  for Agriculture/construction  was  20.25 percent.  Since  Eximbank generally
lends  for capital  improvements  (equipment/buildings)  and  for longer terms (up to 10-15
years),  these subsidy  rates  are  generally  higher than for export of agricultural  commodities.
Abraham reports  subsidy estimates for  officially  supported exports  of the  United
Kingdom,  France,  Belgium,  and  Germany.  He advances  two methodologies  for estimating
credit subsidies  (net difference method  and the net present value method)  and one to measure
export credit  insurance  subsidies.  The net difference  method values subsidies  as the
summation over the years of the loan of the difference  in interest rates times the amount  of
loan principal outstanding.  The  implied  subsidy  is defined  as:
K
SubsidyK  =  Ut  (rK-  R)  (2)
t=T
where
U  is total credits  authorized  in t and outstanding  in K,
Rt is the officially  supported  interest rate on loans authorized  in t,
T is the year  in which the oldest still-outstanding  loan was authorized,  and
rK  is the market  interest rate charged  in K.
48The net present  value method  measures subsidies  as the  net present  value of the difference  in
income  flows  from guaranteed  and  non-guaranteed  loans.
Z-K  R,
SubsidyK  =  U-  ----------  (3)
t=l  (1 +  rK)
where
U  is the total value  of loans authorized  in K,
R, is the total repayment  in year t on loans  authorized  in K,
rK  is the market interest rate  in year K,  and
Z is the last year of repayments  on loans  authorized  in K.
Subsidy values  for export credit insurance  are  estimated as  the difference  in the pure
insurance premium  and the subsidized  insurance  premium.
SubsidyK  =  AK  (K  - OK)  (4)
where
AK  is  the value of insured contracts  in year K,
VK  is the pure  insurance premium  in year K (in percentage  terms),  and
oK  is the  subsidized  insurance premium  in year K (in percentage  terms).
Abraham  reported  on subsidy  measures for French direct credits  and measured  credit
insurance  subsides  for COFACE insurance.  Subsidy  rates  for direct credits  ranged  from 0.5
percent to 5.1  percent for 1970-1984.  He found  that implicit  subsidies for COFACE
insurance  guarantees  increased  from -.3  percent of the  value of guaranteed  exports  in 1973  to
2.29 percent  in  1987.  Abraham  adjusted  these subsidy rates to incorporate recoveries  on
claims  paid by  the French Treasury.  Adjusted  subsidy rates were  less than 1 percent of the
value of exports  in all years  (1973-1987).  However,  he cautions  that not all  recoveries  paid
by  the French  Treasury reflect  payments collected  on claims.  These  estimates  are
significantly  lower than those estimated  for Eximbank  credits by Baron.
Skully  (1991)  presents  a methodology  for estimating  the  level of subsidies  in U.S.
agricultural  export programs,  including  GSM-102,  GSM-103,  and  P.L.480  Title I.  He
established  the value  of subsidies by calculating  the spread  between  loans granted with GSM
credits  and the alternative  cost of borrowing  for individual  importing countries.  Skully
estimates  the implicit subsidy  rate as:
Implicit subsidy  rate  =  E, P, (1 +  r)t (1 +  6j)-t
49where
P is principal,
r is the GSM  interest rate,
6  is risk adjusted interest rate in importing  country j,  and
t is the term of the guarantee.
Because  the alternative  cost of borrowing  (for non-guaranteed  credit)  was not directly
observable  for many  countries,  Skully  created  a proxy  based on an estimated  relationship
among  country  risk measures,  the value of secondary  debt,  and  a bond yield index.  Subsidy
estimates  were also developed  for other U.S.  export programs,  including EEP  and PL. 480.
For importing  countries,  the aggregate subsidy value of these  U.S. programs  ranged  from
1.5  to  100 percent  of export volume  in FY  1987  (Table 6).
Hyberg  et al.  recently expanded  this research on the  subsidy component  of GSM
programs.  Annual  subsidies  were estimated  by commodity  for wheat,  corn,  soybeans,
sorghum,  barley,  flour,  soybean  meal,  and soybean  oil from  1979-1992 for all importers.
Estimates  of the interest subsidy  for all GSM  credits extended  for wheat exports from  1988
to  1992  ranged  from a low of 4.3  percent in  1991  to a  high of 6.33 percent of the value of
GSM allocations  in  1988  (Table  7).  From  1979 to 1992,  interest subsidies  on GSM  credits
for wheat  exports have averaged 4.39 percent of the value  of allocations.  This  is an
indication of the potential magnitude  of implicit interest  subsidies  extended to countries  for
given commodities.
Hyberg et al.  indicate  that the estimated  interest  subsidies  vary by commodity  and
type of commodity,  whether processed  or not.  Average  implied  interest subsidies from
1979-1992 for processed products,  soybean oil and meal  (6 percent),  and wheat flour (7
percent)  were higher than subsidies  for bulk commodities  (4-5 percent)  (Appendix  Table  1).
They indicate this may be because importers  of processed  products under GSM programs
lack a developed  processing  sector and are less creditworthy.
50Table  6.  Export  Volumes  and Subsidy  Equivalents  for U.S.  Wheat,  FY  1987.






















































































































































GSM  Allocations  and Interest  Subsidy  Estimates  for U.S.  Wheat Exports,  1979-
Wheat  GSM  GSM
Year  Allocations  Subsidy  Subsidy
--------million dollars--------  Percent
1979  416  4  0.96
1980  389  3  0.77
1981  586  4  0.68
1982  679  10  1.47
1983  1603  45  2.81
1984  1896  66  3.48
1985  971  47  4.84
1986  810  56  6.91
1987  738  45  6.10
1988  1075  68  6.33
1989  1521  88  5.79
1990  1211  63  5.20
1991  837  36  4.30
1992  1592  95  5.97
Total  14325  629  4.39
Source:  Hyberg et al.
52Estimated Subsidies  for Selected  GSM-102  Credit Guarantees - by Country
Skully  (1992)  and Hyberg  et al.  aggregated country-by-country  estimates  of implicit
interest subsidies,  but did not report individual  observations.  To provide  an example  of the
potential  range  of results for individual  countries  (importers),  implied  interest subsidies  were
calculated for selected  countries receiving  GSM credit guarantees.  GSM guaranteed  loans
are typically  structured  with annual  or semi-annual  payments  over the term of the loan.
Since Baron's subsidy  estimation assumes  continuous  discounting,  a discrete  formulation
following Raynauld  was used.'o  Implicit subsidy  rates were estimated  as:
Subsidy rate  =  100 * (1-r/d)  * (1-(1-  1/(1+d)T)/(d*T))
where
Subsidy rate  is expressed  as  a percentage  of the loan value,
r is the GSM  interest rate,
d  is the reference  or discount  interest  rate,  and
T is the term of the  loan.
Thus,  subsidy  rates depend  on the  term of the loan and the spread between the GSM  and  the
importer's  risk adjusted rates.  The relationship  among these  factors  is demonstrated  in
Figure  6.
Countries  were  selected  on the basis of availability  of observations  for interest rate
spreads  and use of GSM guarantees  for wheat imports.  An effort was  made to obtain
countries  that represented  a cross section of countries utilizing GSM  guarantees  based  on the
potential  to default.  Data on interest  rate  spreads over LIBOR were  gathered  for selected
countries  and  years from  Leipold et al.  and  Collyns et  al.  (Table  8).  Quantities  and values
of wheat exports under  GSM programs  were  obtained  from USDA-FAS.  Interest rates  for
exports under GSM credit guarantees  were  assumed to be LIBOR plus  25 basis points
(Barovick).  Implied  subsidies  are  presented both on a dollars  per ton and percent  of export
value  basis.
loThe  discrete  subsidy estimation by Raynauld  is  similar to Skully  (1992),  however
Raynaud  directly  estimates the  implicit  subsidy,  whereas  Skully estimates  the  discounted
value  of the loan guaranteed  from which the subsidy  can then be established.
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Figure 6.  Relationship Between Interest Rate Differential and Implied Interest
Subsidy, by Term of Guarantee.Table  8.  LIBOR and Interest  Rate  Spreads  for Countries,  by Year.
Year  LIBOR  Algeria  Brazil  Mexico  Tunisia  Turkey  Venezuela
------------- (Interest  spread  over LIBOR)---------
83  11.29  1.37
84  8.64  1.86  1.02
85  6.85  1.86  0.75  0.75
86  7.30  1.95  0.85  0.85
87  8.13  2.08  0.94  0.94
88  9.27  1.49  8.20  1.93  1.85
89  8.35  1.00  3.66  1.66  2.60
90  6.08  5.23  2.01  2.30
91  3.90  4.01  1.95  2.56
Implied interest subsidies  for the  selected countries  ranged  from $18.89  per ton for
Mexico  in 1988 to $0.29 per ton to Tunisia in  1986 (Table 9).  Subsidies measured  as a
percent of export  value ranged from 0.89 percent for Tunisia and  Turkey in 1985  to  12.43
percent for Mexico  in 1988.  Most of the  countries examined had  implied  interest subsidies
in the range of $2 to  $6 per ton (1 to 5 percent of export value).  This  is within the range  of
subsidies for credit guarantees estimated by Skully  (1992)  and Hyberg et al.
Differences  in subsidy  levels  for individual  countries  varied from year to year (Figure
7,  Table  9).  For example,  Mexico dropped  from a subsidy of $18.89 per ton (12.43  percent)
in 1988 to $8.79  (5.59 percent),  and $4.02 per ton (2.99 percent)  in 1989 and  1990,
respectively.  All of the other countries  examined  showed similar  variability  across years.
Both inter-country  and inter-year  differences  in subsidies can be substantial.  However,  since
data on interest rate  differentials/spreads  are limited,  further research  in this  area would  be
useful.
55Table  9.  Estimated Interest  Subsidies  for Wheat  Exports Under GSM-102  for Selected
Countries and  Years.
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Figure 7.  Implied Interest Subsidies for Wheat Exports Under







0PREVIOUS  STUDIES  ON EXPORT CREDIT
Effects of export credit insurance/guarantees  have been examined  in previous  studies
from a number  of perspectives.  Much of the research has focused  on welfare gains  and
losses,  costs  of credit programs,  the effectiveness of credit programs in terms of trade
creation (additionality),  and other justifications  for extending credit guarantees.  This section
reviews  selected  studies related to export  subsidies and  credit guarantees.
Value  of Credit Guarantee Programs - Subsidy  Element  and Justification
Extension  of credit guarantees  and insurance  has fostered  discussion of the value of
export credit guarantee  programs.  Baron examined  Eximbank programs and  indicates that
there  are several  rationales  for extension of credit guarantees.  He identifies  6 justifications
for Eximbank programs:
1) they  are  a means of responding  to  capital market imperfections  that  impede foreign
trade,  2) they are  a means of responding  to capital market deficiencies  that are
perceived  to bias the market-dictated  allocation of resources  against  the export  of
large scale  projects  and long  lived capital  assets,  3) they provide direct measures  to
improve the balance of payments  and to increase  employment,  4)  they maintain U.S.
product  dominance in certain  industries,  5) officially  supported export  financing  is a
form of aid to developing  countries,  and 6)  foreign officially  supported  export
financing necessitates  a  U.S.  response  in order to maintain the competitiveness  of
U.S. exports  and  convince  other nations to cease their concessionary  financing  (pp.
59-69)
These  are  largely relevant  to agricultural  commodities except for  item (2),  concerning  long-
lived capital assets.  Item  (6),  concerning  the need  to maintain the  competitiveness  of U.S.
exports  in the  face of competitor  programs,  is frequently  made  by proponents  of expanded
EEP and GSM credit  allocations.
Another  claim that has been debated  heavily  is that export subsidies  can be  welfare-
enhancing  to the exporting  country  in specific  situations.  Paarlberg argues  that policymakers
may attach different  values to the welfare  of producers,  consumers,  and taxpayers.  In this
case,  it may be rational  for policymakers  to undertake export  subsidy programs  despite the
welfare  losses  they  impose.  Alston et al.  indicate  that a  rationale  for extending  agricultural
export  subsides  is that they can be  a component of a more cost-effective  means of producer
price  support  than direct  output  subsidies.
Barichello and Vercammen proposed  a methodology  for measuring benefits  of
extending credit guarantees  using an alternative  maximization objective  for policymakers  (that
of maximizing  producer surplus  or specifically,  benefits to  farmer pools in Canada).  They
indicate  that measurement  of benefits to pools could be measured  in two  ways.  One method
58is evaluating  differences  in interest rate  differentials  for guaranteed  and  non-guaranteed  sales
and using  elasticities  for excess  supply  and  excess  demand to determine how much of the
differential  is captured  by the farmer pools.  A second  method  assumes that the Canadian
Wheat Board  is able  to exert market power either  through limits on the quantity  of export
credit allocated  or through monopoly  power to charge  higher prices for credit guaranteed
sales.  If so,  the benefit to farmer pools  could be evaluated  by examining  the price
differential  between cash and credit guaranteed  sales.
Brander  and  Spencer,  using  a game theory  approach,  show conditions  under which
export  subsidies  are a rational  strategy  for exporters.  Extending  this  line of analysis  to
export credit programs,  it is possible to cast strategic decisions  in the form of a "prisoners'
dilemma"  : two competing  exporters  may each extend credit programs  to a particular  market,
fearing  a loss of market  share if they  do not.  Thus,  extension of credit (and the  implied
subsidies) by both competitors can be welfare  decreasing,  absent any mechanism for
coordination.
Welfare Effects  on Trade
Much of the  theoretical  research  on export subsidies  has implications  for export credit
guarantee  programs.  Seitzinger  and Paarlberg  reviewed  theoretical  and empirical  research
relating to  export assistance  and trade.  Research has addressed  both global and targeted
export subsidies,  and  different forms  of subsidy  (price,  transfer,  and  in-kind).
Theoretical  research on export subsidies  has utilized general  equilibrium,  partial
equilibrium,  and  game theory approaches  to examine export  assistance,  whether in the form
of cash subsidies,  transfers  of goods,  or payments-in-kind  (Dixit and Norman;  Grigsby  and
Dixit; Karp and McCalla,  among others).  Empirical  and theoretical  research of global  cash
export assistance  usually indicates  that exporter  welfare  is reduced,  and that exporting
producers  and  foreign consumers  benefit at the expense  of domestic  consumers,  taxpayers,
and  foreign producers.
Abraham  examined  the effects  of export credit  and  insurance  subsidies using  a partial
equilibrium conjectural  variation  model of an international  oligopoly.  The model was  used to
examine  effects of export financing  subsidies  on EU exporters in different  states and  non EU-
exporters.  Abraham  found that cost-reducing  and revenue-increasing  export financing
subsidies by  an EU country  expand exports  at the expense  of non-subsidizing  exporters.
However,  if competing countries  respond  with countervailing  subsidies,  the effects  of
subsidies on export market shares  and volumes  can be negated.  Further,  he found  industry-
specific conditions  can alter the  effects of subsidies.  Export  subsidies provide a  greater
stimulus to  exports when
591) subsidies are  substantial,  2)  the  cost difference  between competitors  is not
too  large,  3) market demand  is price elastic,  4) competition within the industry
is intense,  5) product differentiation  is limited,  and  6)  there exist economies  of
scale in the industry  (p.  130).
Seitzinger  and Paarlberg  reviewed  theoretical  research on targeted  export assistance.
Research  in this area has indicated that there  is potential for increasing  exporter welfare
when subsidies  are targeted  to countries with more elastic  demand  functions and  subsidies  are
not countered  by other exporting  countries.  If subsidies  are countered,  then welfare  declines
for all exporters.  Empirical  research has  indicated  that targeted assistance  offers  small
benefits  in expanding  exports,  but substantial  disruption of trade  flows.
A number of articles have  indicated potential situations  in which general  and  targeted
subsidies can be welfare  increasing  in the  subsidizing country  (Brander and  Spencer,  1985;
Feenstra,  Itoh  and Kiyono,  and  Abbott et al.).  Situations  identified  include subsidizing
marginal  goods,  failure to take advantage  of market power  in a second  or third good,  and the
ability  to price discriminate  across importing  markets  with differing  import elasticities.
However,  Bohman et al.  indicated  that  in the case  of U.S.  wheat,  the likelihood of such
conditions  is limited."
Studies on  Factors Affecting  Allocation  of Export Credit Programs
There has been little research  on factors affecting  credit allocation decisions by major
exporting  countries.  Yang  and Wilson examined factors affecting  allocations  of U.S.,  EU,
and Canadian  credit programs.  They examined  factors  affecting allocation of credit
guarantees  and quantities extended using  three types of models  (Tobit model,  two-step Cragg
Model,  and  a Dominance  Model).  They found the two-step Cragg model  fit allocation and
quantity  decisions  for the U.S.  and Canada,  while  a Tobit model  provided  a better fit for EU
decision processes.
Results indicated  that credit allocations  by the U.S.  and Canada  reflect a two-step
decision process:  the  first decision is whether to  provide  credit to  a particular country;  the
"Studies  not focusing  on export credit in this  area include  a study by Anania  et al.
which examined  the justification and effectiveness  of the Export Enhancement  Program.
They used  a partial equilibrium  spatial model  to  examine whether  the EEP program was
welfare  enhancing,  cost effective,  and budget neutral;  provided  additionality of exports;  and
was targeted  toward  countries the EH  subsidized heavily.  They  indicated that  in the area of
new  trade research,  specific  situations  have been identified when export subsidies would be
welfare  enhancing.  However,  they  also argued  that none of these conditions  exist in the case
of the world wheat market for the U.S.
60second decision  is how much to provide.  Exogenous  variables  can have  different impacts  on
the  two stages of the decision process.  Results  indicated  that the U.S.  targets larger markets
than do competing  exporters with credit programs.  The  U.S.  was more  likely to allocate
credit to countries  with higher risk assessments  and lower ability to repay.  However,  it was
less  likely to  extend large amounts  of credit to these countries.  Results  for Canada  were
similar to those  for the United  States.  Results for the EU  indicated  a  one-step process,
where the allocation decision and quantity  were  influenced by the same  criteria,  notably
market  size.
Johnson  (1995)  examined  importer credit allocation  decisions  for a two-exporter  case.
A  non-linear programming  model  was  constructed to examine  the effects of credit programs
on prices,  trade  volumes,  and welfare.  His results  indicate  a number of things.  First,
extension of export credit can be welfare  enhancing  when credit is constrained  in the
importing  country.  Second,  if credit is constrained,  extension of credit by one country  can
be welfare enhancing for competing  exporters  by relaxing  credit constraints  for all products.
Third,  credit programs  are  not necessarily  welfare  enhancing  for exporters.  This depends  on
the size  of the credit program and the size of the implicit subsidy.  Fourth,  crossprice  effects
of competing  countries  affect  additionality of exports.  U.S.  exports to  countries  where U.S.
wheat is a close  substitute will producer  higher additional  exports than where  U.S.  wheat is
less substitutable.  Fifth,  extension  of credit can produce  additionality  through a price-subsidy
and/or credit-expansion  effects.  Sixth,  measuring  additionality  and welfare effects  when
competing countries have  credit programs  depends  on the  organizational  structure of the
exporting  agencies.
Additionality of Exports
Several  studies  have  quantified export additionality  (trade creation)  induced  by credit
loans and  guarantees,  primarily for the Eximbank.  Baron examined  additionality  of exports
for Eximbank  credit programs.  He reviewed three  studies  on Eximbank  loans  (U.S.
Department of the Treasury,  1980;  Export-Import  Bank,  1981,  1982).  These  studies
classified additionality  as  1) additional  exports obtained  that would have  been lost due to
foreign concessionary  financing,  2)  additional  exports that would have  been lost because  the
cost of financing  was unacceptable  or unavailable,  and 3) additional exports  that would have
been lost because  foreign products had better quality,  terms,  or delivery  specifications.
Subjective  assessments of additionality  were developed  for each  loan in the years  under
study.  Scores  for each measure  were  weighted and combined to form an overall  index  of
additionality  for each type,  averaged  across loans.
Baron indicates  that Treasury  and Eximbank methodologies  relied  heavily  on
subjective  assessments to determine  weighting  and ranking  of additionality.  Further,  in all 3
studies,  portions  of the classifications  relied on assessments  by  Eximbank.  This  could have
biased the  results;  however,  Baron mentions  that  assessments from Eximbank  were obtained
from divisions  not directly  making  loans.  Baron's  primary criticism  of these  studies  is that
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effective  price to importers.  He  indicates that  effect of credits on exports should be
measured  as a  function of interest rate,  credit/export  value,  export value,  repayment
schedule,  and competition.  Further,  these  studies ignore the effects  of competitors'  officially
supported  credits.
The GAO examined  the additionality of Eximbank  programs through  surveys  of
program participants  (GAO,  1987).  Respondents  were asked to estimate  the level of exports
with and  without Eximbank  guarantees.  Their  results indicated  that  11  percent of the insured
value  of export volumes  and  73  percent of the insured  shipments  would proceed  without
Eximbank insurance.
Studies  have  also examined additionality  of other export programs,  including  GSM
credit guarantees.  Fleming  examined the effect of PL.480 and GSM  credit programs  on rice
exports.  She found  that extension of GSM programs  increased  imports  of rice by  55 percent.
However,  this model  did not consider  the effects of EEP or competitor  programs,  and
focused only  on countries  receiving  credit.  Another  study by Grigsby  and Dixit (1986)
indicated that credit programs would  increase  total exports  only when tied to additional
exports.  Otherwise,  export credit-financed  sales  would  simply replace  commercial  sales.
Other studies  have  examined effects  of export programs by treating  export programs,
including  credit guarantees,  as exogenous  variables (typically,  dummy variables).  These
include  studies by  Arnade  and Davison,  and Koo and Karemara.
Wilson  and Yang  examined additionality  of exports  by analyzing  the  effectiveness  of
principal  export strategies  (credit guarantees,  long-term  trade agreements,  PL 480,  and the
Export Enhancement  Program) on market shares.  Their results  indicated  that the responses
of U.S.  and Canadian market  shares to credit were  significant  in 1982.  However,  the
effectiveness  of U.S.  credit programs  declined with the advent of the EEP program  and did
not significantly  affect market shares  from 1986  forward.  Further,  the elasticities  indicated
that  in 1982,  the Canadian credit programs  were more effective  than U.S. programs,  i.e.,
extension  of Canadian credit decreased  U.S.  market shares  more than U.S.  credit programs
decreased  Canadian market  shares.
Baxter and Smith discuss the  influence  of exchange rate  risk and dollar appreciation
on export credit  guarantee  programs.  They  examine  the potential  for  an exchange  rate
guarantee  program,  which would  place a ceiling  on the rate of exchange  to be used in
repaying  dollar loans,  thereby  making credit  programs more attractive to importers.  If this
program produces additional  credit exports (without displacing other U.S.  exports) that are
greater  in value  than the cost  of operating  the program,  it could be judged  successful.
However,  the  authors conclude  that the break-even  level of exports  is not likely  to be
attained.  In addition,  they  indicate  that those countries that have  the greatest potential for
using  additional  export credits also show  the  greatest potential  for displacing other U.S.
commercial exports (export volumes  extended  under credit programs  would tend to replace
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effective.
Costs  of Programs
Oversight  hearings of the Trade  Titles of the  1990  Farm Bill examined  previous
studies  of loan losses under GSM-102  and  GSM-103.  Testimony on May  21,  1991,
discussed a  1991  GAO report  and defense of FAS and USDA testimonies  (U.S.  Congress,
House,  1991).  In this testimony,  two estimates  of loan losses  are examined.  USDA
estimated historical  default  losses at  10.4 percent of loans granted.  However,  the GAO
(1991)  estimated that potential losses under  GSM programs  would run 60 percent of average
loan amounts  outstanding.  Further,  the GAO  estimated  the average  risk of GSM credits  and
PL. 480 aid outstanding  using  secondary market prices for commercial  bank loans.  Results
indicated  a higher risk component in the GSM  credits outstanding  than for PL.  480 aid.
USDA  and FAS argued  that the GAO  study overstated  potential  losses for 4  reasons:
1) CCC debt becomes  sovereign debt when CCC acquires  it.  This  is not the same as the
previous debt.  2)  CCC  is able  to reschedule  most of the  debts and continue  to receive
payments,  so the debt is not lost.  3) Countries  tend to pay back this debt first.  Thus,
repayment  is more sure than other debt.  4) Countries  also tend to stay current  to continue
their eligibility  for loans  (U.S.  Congress,  House,  1991,  pp.  84-86).
GAO  examined potential  defaults  by GSM programs  again in  1992.  Potential  losses
were  again estimated  by  assessing  the value of debt in  secondary  markets.  Losses were
estimated  as 48  percent of total loans outstanding  as of December  1992  ($6.5  billion in
losses).  They  also  indicated that  losses under the  GSM program would increase at the rate  of
$74 million per year  if loan guarantee  exposure to participating  countries remains unchanged
(GAO,  1992).
ISSUES  CONFRONTING  U.S.  CREDIT GUARANTEE  PROGRAMS
Many  issues  are currently  confronting export credit guarantee  programs  for grains.
These  issues relate  largely  to program justification,  implementation,  and  the cost of credit
guarantee  programs.  The remainder of this  section discusses issues  related  to credit terms,
additionality  and  inter-country  rivalry,  and credit allocation decisions.
Credit Terms
Many  of the  export credit  guarantee programs  were developed  in the late  1970s  and
early  1980s.  Programs were designed  with longer terms to offset balance  of payments
problems  experienced  by  importers and were  generally made  on a country-to-country  basis.
In the early  1990s,  most export credit guarantees  were  transacted  with foreign banks rather
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banks within a  country in addition to country  risk.  Since most transactions  are  with
importing  banks  rather than governments,  a relevant issue  is:  why  credit guarantees  are
extended  for such long terms  (e.g.,  3 years),  much longer than needed  to process and
consume  the commodity.  More generally,  there  is a need  to reevaluate  current credit
guarantee  programs  provisions.
Another  facet  concerns the  implicit interest subsidy  provided to importers.  Loan
guarantees  are typically  made for terms up to 3 years.  However,  these  terms (and the
implicit interest  subsidy) are not necessarily  transmitted by  foreign banks to foreign buyers.
Rather,  the importer's bank may  extend credit at (higher) commercial  rates  and for shorter
terms (e.g.,  3-6 months).  The U.S.  guarantee,  in this case,  provides a low-cost source  of
funds to foreign banks,  which may  not be fully transmitted  to buyers that would influence
their purchase  decisions  of U.S.  commodities.  A potential remedy,  now being examined,  is
to eliminate  the  importing bank and  guarantee direct lending  by U.S.  banks  to foreign
buyers,  at commercial  terms  (30,  60,  90,  180 days)  and low interest  rates.
The competitiveness  or value  of U.S.  export credit guarantee programs  in comparison
to competitors'  programs  is another  issue.  Terms  for U.S.  programs  are standardized,  while
other exporting  countries have more  flexible terms.  For example,  the U.S.  programs charge
all countries  the  same premium  for obtaining GSM  guarantees.  Premiums  are based  solely
on the period  of the guarantee.  Other guarantee  programs  (e.g.,  Canada's)  set premiums
based  on the inherent risk of the  loan.  Thus,  less  risky borrowers  pay less  than high risk
borrowers.  Other changes  to program provisions  that have  been suggested  include the
addition of coverage  for freight and shipping,  and  exchange rate guarantees.  What is the
cost of making  terms of U.S.  programs  more  flexible and/or adding coverage?  Of what
value  are these changes to prospective  importers?  In addition,  the U.S.  announces aspects  of
its export credit  programs at the beginning of each marketing year,  whereas  competitors like
France make  program terms  and allocations  less transparent.
Competing  countries'  programs are  also changing.  COFACE dominates  both intra-
EU trade  and  non-EU trade  in the EU,  but other competing firms  are providing  minimal
quantities  of guarantees.  COFACE  is under pressure  to merge  with Societe  Francaise
d -Assurance  Credit (SFAC)  so that all terms of credit guarantees  could be obtained  within
one  agency.  In addition,  ECGD (UK short-term  Guarantee Agency)  is being pressured  to
turn private within the next 5 to  10 years.  The EU  is also opening  up private  insurance to
all companies  within the Union.  Thus,  firms do not have to have a presence  in the issuing
country.  This  indicates there may be competitive  pressure  on export credit agencies  of EU
member states from private firms.  However,  there  also exists the potential for consolidation
among  export credit  agencies  or the development  of EU credit guarantors  rather than private
firms  (The Banker,  1989,  pp.  40-48).
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The justification of credit guarantee  programs,  and export subsidies  in general,  is
increasingly  called  into question.  Increasing  costs  of program operation,  due to increased
defaults  on loans and  competing  exporting  countries'  retaliation,  are forcing countries to
evaluate the whole  area of export  subsidy programs.  Oversight hearings  and GAO  studies on
GSM-102  and GSM-103  have  examined  the costs of credit guarantee programs  (GAO  1991,
1992).
Justification  for providing  credit guarantees  has been argued  on the basis of providing
additional  exports to credit  constrained countries  over and above  those that would have
occurred  in the absence of export credit guarantee  programs.  However,  additionality  is
difficult  to substantiate,  particularly  in view of uncertainties about competing  countries'
export  subsidies  and the fungibility  of commodities  like wheat.  If the United States is able to
displace  exports  from another  country  in one market,  through credit sales or direct price
subsidies,  the competitor may target  a second  market.  Effects of U.S.  subsidies  are
mitigated  by competitor  responses  in one market or another.  Thus,  while market shares  may
shift on a  regional  basis,  the aggregate  impact on U.S.  export volume may be insubstantial.
Industry representatives  have  also indicated that use of GSM credit guarantee
programs  allows them to leverage  lending  to  importing countries and exceed  their own
internal country lending  limits.  However,  the extent that any one  country  is able  to increase
borrowing  is uncertain.  Representatives  indicate  that in the current competitive  environment,
the extension  of credit guarantees  may be required to  maintain export market shares.
However,  a basic tenant  in finance  literature,  the Fischer  separation theorem,  states that
production-investment  decisions  are separate  from consumption-financing  decisions when
finance markets  are efficient.  Thus,  it can be argued that incorporation of reduced credit
terms  would simply result in a shifting of the timing  of purchases  rather than additional
exports.
Credit Allocation  Decisions
The mix of countries and the allocation of credit guarantees  is another  issue being
discussed.  In  light of recent defaults,  GAO  has suggested that GSM guarantees  should be
targeted to countries  with lower risk of default.  However,  USDA-FAS  has  indicated that
most countries with  low risk of default can obtain financing  without credit guarantees  and
that the potential  to expand agricultural  imports  to these  countries  is  limited.  Expanded
exports are  more likely to occur  in less  creditworthy  countries  (GAO,  1992).
Revisions of the  1990 trade act have prohibited extension of GSM credits  to countries
unable  to service  loans,  for foreign policy  purposes,  or as foreign aid or debt rescheduling.
These provisions  moved  some  countries  into Food Aid that had previously  received  GSM
credits.  Because the  1990  trade act mandates  a minimum  of $5  billion in guarantees,  CCC
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concerns  were also raised  about these provisions  in light of extension of $1.5  billion in
credits to Russia and  the long-term  costs of credit guarantee  programs.  Discussion on credit
programs at that time focused  on making  sales  for reasons  of national  interest.  However,
this did not appear to be consistent  with the legislative  intent.
Use  of credit guarantees  versus direct price subsidies  in export promotion is also  a
major issue.  Direct  price subsidies,  as  in the case  of EEP,  appear on budget as costs  to the
exporting  country in the year that they  are granted  and count toward GATT limits.
However,  costs for credit guarantee  programs  are essentially  expected costs  and,  if incurred,
are  deferred.  As such,  they don't appear  on budget until  an actual default occurs.  This
difference  in export promotion  programs  will become more important now that the GATT
agreement  has been enacted.  Further,  extension of credit guarantees/insurance  may be a
method  for exporting  countries  to shelter  or hide  their export subsidies.
GSM-102 and  GSM-103  have  come under fire  for non-compliance  with requirements
on U.S.  origin of commodities  receiving  export credits  in the case of tobacco  in 1988.  This
spawned  requests  for examination  of other commodities  to determine if similar problems
exist.
Funds for U.S.  export credit programs  have been examined  in relation  to the type  of
export guaranteed.  Oversight hearings  have  revealed  that,  while agriculture  gets  a major
share  (75  percent) of funds  allocated to  export promotion,  it comprises  only about  11  percent
of total  exports (U.S.  Congress,  House,  1992.  p.  347).  The  Clinton administration has
indicated  a  willingness to transfer  export promotion funds  from agriculture  to promote
industrial  goods (Kiplinger  Letter,  Oct.  1993,  p.  3).
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
Export credit guarantees  have become  an important  factor in the world wheat trade.
All major exporting  countries  of agricultural  commodities  have some form of export credit
insurance/guarantee  program,  although  their utilization has varied.  The U.S.  granted  the
majority  of export credit guarantees  for wheat  during  the  1980s  and early  1990s,  although
Canada  extended  significant quantities  in the late  1980s and early  1990s.  Egypt,  Brazil,  and
China were  significant recipients  of export credit  guarantees for wheat during  the early
1980s.  In the late  1980s,  Egypt,  Iraq, Korea,  Morocco,  and Algeria were  significant
recipients.  Significant quantities  and proportions of credit guarantees  have been extended by
most wheat exporting  countries  to the  Former Soviet  Union in the late  1980s and early
1990s.  In fact,  credit guarantees  for wheat exports during  1990 and  1991  by all countries
are heavily  concentrated  in guarantees  extended  to the FSU.  This heavy  concentration of
guarantees  in a single  country poses  a significant problem  for all exporters  in light of recent
defaults by  Russia.
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indebtedness  and debt-servicing  ability in the past two decades.  On some measures  (e.g.,
debt service  ratios),  the situation  improved  on average  for wheat  importers  in the  decade
after  1982.  However,  recipients  of export credits  and  credit guarantees  continued to show
high debt-service  ratios in the  early  1990s  and lower average  creditworthiness  than the
average for wheat importers.  Cluster  analysis results  indicate that wheat importers  using
guarantees  have  similar characteristics,  in terms of average  standard  of living  and other
economic  variables.  Identification of common characteristics  may  help target other potential
users of GSM  programs.
Most credit programs offered  by countries  exporting agricultural  products provide
more flexibility,  both in terms and  administration,  than programs provided by the United
States.  Further,  the U.S.  program  is operated  as  a highly visible public  credit guarantee
program,  in contrast to the programs  of other countries,  which are more comparable  to
insurance and  are less transparent.
Total  interest subsidies  (estimated by  Skully  (1992),  Hyberg,  et al.,  and  in this study)
indicate that subsidies  to importers  inherent  in GSM  guarantees  are substantial.  Implicit
interest subsidies  for aggregate bulk agricultural  commodities  for  1979 to  1992  averaged 4  to
5 percent of the value of exports.  Implicit interest  subsidies for individual countries  for
wheat were generally  within this same range.  However,  they varied  widely across countries
and years  with a high of $18.89 per metric  ton (12.43  percent of value)  to Mexico  in 1988.
Research  in the area  of export credit guarantees  and export  subsidies in general  has
focused  on welfare  effects,  program costs,  the  subsidy  value of export credit guarantees,  and
the additionality  they entail.  Studies have  indicated that  subsidies have  limited potential  for
increasing  the welfare  of exporting  countries;  in the case of wheat,  in particular,  the weight
of the evidence  is that export subsidies  are unlikely to enhance  welfare  in the exporting
country.
Other justifications  or rationales  for subsidies  have been advanced.  Subsidies  have
been promoted  as  a more cost-effective  means for  supporting producer prices  and  as a
response  or deterrent to competitors'  programs.
Many  issues are  important and  will continue  to  affect credit guarantee  programs  for
agricultural  exports  in the near future.  Most of these  relate  to program justification,
additionality,  program costs,  provisions,  and competition with EEP subsidies and  other
exporting  countries'  programs.  Additional  research would help policymakers  resolve  these
issues.  The future  evolution of credit guarantee  programs  will reflect changing global
disciplines  on export  subsidies  and continuing  concern by policymakers  about  the costs of
operating  these programs.
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73APPENDIX
Appendix  Table  1.  GSM Discounts by Selected  Commodities,  1979-1992.
Fiscal
Year  Wheat  Corn  SoybeansSorghum  Barley  Flour  Meal  Oil  Total
---------------------------------- (million dollars)---------------------------
1979  4  *  0  *  0  0  0  5  9
1980  3  3  0  *  0  *  *  1  8
1981  4  13  2  *  *  *  3  1  24
1982  10  2  2  *  0  *  1  4  19
1983  45  23  11  12  1  4  4  7  106
1984  66  13  3  7  6  1  7  4  105
1985  47  6  3  5  0  1  4  6  71
1986  56  23  19  3  *  7  7  6  122
1987  45  35  23  5  1  7  10  6  132
1988  68  59  25  8  4  3  20  14  202
1989  88  50  24  14  2  8  23  9  219
1990  63  42  11  13  3  3  11  8  153
1991  36  70  20  11  1  *  27  3  166
1992  95  47  25  11  2  2  30  6  220
Total  629  387  166  89  20  37  148  79  1556
Discounts as percent of approvals
Percent  4  4  4  4  6  7  5  5  4
* =  less than $0.5  million.
Source:  Hyberg  et al.
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